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RETHINKING JUDGMENTS RECIPROCITY*
JOHN F. COYLE**
Scholars have long debated the criteria that U.S. courts should
use when deciding whether to recognize and enforce money
judgments rendered by foreign courts. One of the proposed
criteria-reciprocity-would require proof that the rendering
court would enforce a U.S. judgment if the situation were
reversed. Advocates of reciprocity claim that it is necessary to
create incentives for foreign states to recognize and enforce U.S.
judgments. Critics argue that a policy of judgments reciprocity is
both costly to administer and highly unlikely to bring about any
change in foreign state practice.
This Article makes two original contributions to the debate. First,
it draws on historical examples of successful reciprocal
legislation to construct an analytical framework for determining
the conditions under which such legislation is most likely to be
successful in changing foreign state behavior. These examples
show that a particular state's response to such legislation will
frequently be shaped by the reaction of interest groups within
that state. Second, this Article seeks to evaluate how interest
groups within specific foreign states-those that currently refuse
to enforce U.S. judgments-would be likely to react to a new
U.S. policy of judgments reciprocity. Drawing upon a hand-
collected dataset of reported cases and federal complaints, it
argues that judgment creditors in many of these states are likely
to suffer few, if any, economic losses as a result of such a policy.
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In the absence of such losses, these judgment creditors are
unlikely to lobby their respective home state governments to
change their laws. And in the absence of such lobbying, few (if
any) foreign states are likely to change their laws to make it
easier to enforce U.S. judgments abroad.
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INTRODUCTION
The criteria for determining when a money judgment rendered
by a foreign court should be recognized and enforced in the United
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States are for the most part uncontroversial.1 There is general
agreement that such judgments should not be enforced if a foreign
legal system is not impartial or if the court in question lacked
personal jurisdiction over the U.S. defendant.2 There is also a
consensus that the mere fact that a judgment was rendered by a
foreign court is not a valid reason for refusing to enforce it.3 There
are, however, certain proposed criteria about which scholars remain
bitterly divided. Perhaps the most controversial of these is the
suggestion that a court deciding whether to enforce a foreign
judgment should first determine whether the rendering court would
enforce a U.S. judgment if the situation were reversed. This criterion
is generally known as reciprocity.
The debate as to whether U.S. courts should demand proof of
reciprocity as a condition of enforcing a foreign judgment has raged
for more than a century.' Although most U.S. states have (to date)
declined to impose such a rule, the issue continues to be raised in
discussions at both the state and federal level.s Advocates of
1. This Article deals only with foreign money judgments. See UNIF. FOREIGN-
COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION Act § 3(a)(1), 13 pt. II U.L.A. 25 (Supp.
2013) (describing a "money judgment" as a judgment that "grants or denies recovery of a
sum of money"). Other types of foreign judgments-such as those for child support or
divorce-are beyond its scope.
2. Id. § 4(b)(1) (citing systemic lack of impartiality as mandatory ground for non-
recognition); id. § 4(b)(2) (citing lack of personal jurisdiction as mandatory ground for
non-recognition).
3. Id. § 4(a) ("Except as otherwise provided ... a court ... shall recognize a foreign-
country judgment.").
4. See generally Louisa B. Childs, Note, Shaky Foundations: Criticism of Reciprocity
and the Distinction Between Public and Private International Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 221 (2005) (recounting the long history of the debate). For a sampling of the
literature discussing the merits of judgments reciprocity, see Ronald A. Brand,
Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In Search of Uniformity
and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 281-83 (1991); Katherine R.
Miller, Playground Politics: Assessing the Wisdom of Writing a Reciprocity Requirement
into U.S. International Recognition and Enforcement Law, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 239, 299-302
(2004); Kurt H. Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and
What To Do About It, 42 IOWA L. REV. 236,249-57 (1957); Willis L. M. Reese, The Status
in this Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 783, 790-93 (1950);
Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A
Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1660-62 (1968); William G.
Southard, Comment, The Reciprocity Rule and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 16
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 327,348-49 (1977).
5. When a state court in the United States renders a judgment, federal law generally
requires that it be enforced by the courts of its sister states. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (2012). When a foreign court renders a judgment, by contrast, the issue of
enforceability is in most cases governed by state law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
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reciprocity claim that it is necessary to create incentives for foreign
states to enforce U.S. judgments.6 Critics argue that a policy of
judgments reciprocity is both costly to administer and highly unlikely
to bring about any change in foreign state practice.' This old debate
was rekindled in 2006 when the American Law Institute ("ALI")
proposed a federal statute on the enforcement of foreign judgments
that contained a reciprocity requirement.' This proposal led to the
publication of a number of scholarly articles-many of them critical
of the ALI's provision 9 -and to hearings in 2011 before a
subcommittee of the House of Representatives.o Although the issue
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 cmt. a (1987). But see SPEECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
223, 124 Stat. 2380 (2010) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4105) (establishing a federal rule
for recognizing and enforcing foreign libel judgments). Currently, only two U.S. states-
Georgia and Massachusetts-require proof of reciprocity as a precondition to enforcing a
foreign judgment. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-114(10) (2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 235,§ 23A (LexisNexis 2009). New Hampshire imposes a reciprocity requirement solely upon
judgments rendered by courts in Canada. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524:11 (LexisNexis
2006). Florida, Maine, Ohio, and Texas permit (but do not require) judges to take into
account a lack of reciprocity in deciding whether to enforce a foreign judgment. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 55.605(2)(g) (West Supp. 2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8505(2)(G)
(2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.92(B) (LexisNexis 2010); TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(7) (West 2008). Neither version of the Uniform Act contains a
reciprocity requirement. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS
RECOGNITION ACT, 13 pt. II U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 2013); UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-
JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT 1962, 13 pt. II U.L.A. 44 (Supp. 2013).
6. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE § 7 cmt. b (2006).
7. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 4, at 314-17; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 4, at
1661.
8. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, § 7(a) ("A foreign judgment shall not be
recognized or enforced in a court in the United States if the court finds that comparable
judgments of courts in the United States would not be recognized or enforced in the courts
of the state of origin."); see also Discussion of Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute, 82 A.L.I. PROC. 94, 159 (2006)
(remarks of Michael Traynor, President, Am. Law Inst.) (stating that sixty-eight members
of the ALI voted to include the reciprocity clause in the draft statute and that fifty-five
members voted to exclude it).
9. See, e.g., Richard W. Hulbert, Some Thoughts on Judgments, Reciprocity, and the
Seeming Paradox of International Commercial Arbitration, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L. L. 641, 652-
53 (2008); Robert L. McFarland, Federalism, Finality, and Foreign Judgments: Examining
the ALI Judgments Project's Proposed Federal Foreign Judgments Statute, 45 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 63, 92-100 (2010); Miller, supra note 4, at 289-318; Franklin 0. Ballard, Comment,
Turnabout Is Fair Play: Why a Reciprocity Requirement Should Be Included in the America
Law Institute's Proposed Federal Statute, 28 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 199, 222-33 (2006); Vishali
Singal, Note, Preserving Power Without Sacrificing Justice: Creating an Effective
Reciprocity Regime for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 943, 962-68 (2008).
10. In late 2011, a House Subcommittee solicited testimony from several experts as to
the need for a federal statute on the topic of foreign judgments; the possible inclusion of a
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of judgments reciprocity may seem somewhat obscure, it is of deep
and abiding interest to those involved in international civil litigation.n
If the United States were to adopt a national policy of judgments
reciprocity, it would have a profound effect on the ability of plaintiffs
who prevail in a lawsuit abroad to enforce that judgment against a
defendant with assets in the United States.
There are, broadly speaking, two contrasting visions of
judgments reciprocity. The optimistic vision holds that adopting a
reciprocity requirement will benefit U.S. nationals by encouraging
foreign states that currently refuse to recognize and enforce U.S.
judgments to change their laws.12 It will achieve this end by directing
U.S. judges to refuse to enforce judgments rendered by courts in such
states until these states agree to enforce U.S. judgments.13 If the
United States makes it impossible to enforce judgments rendered by
courts in these states in the United States, so this argument goes, then
the foreign states in question are likely to rethink their policy of not
enforcing U.S. judgments. Under this optimistic vision, the reciprocity
requirement would make it possible to enforce U.S. judgments in
jurisdictions where it previously was not.
reciprocity requirement was discussed at some length. See Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial and Admin.
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 11-12 (2012) (statement of Linda J.
Silberman, Martin Lipton Professor of Law, New York University School of Law) ("There
are good arguments on both sides of the reciprocity debate .... "); id. at 65 (testimony of
John B. Bellinger III, Partner, Arnold & Porter LLP) (noting that by requiring reciprocity,
"the ALI proposal encourages other countries to recognize reciprocally and enforce
judgments rendered by U.S. courts"). Should Congress decide to take up legislation on
this topic, this issue is one that will doubtless spark debate between proponents and
opponents of a reciprocity requirement.
11. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION
IN UNITED STATES COURTS 1094-1102 (5th ed. 2011) (discussing judgments reciprocity in
the broader context of international civil litigation).
12. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, § 7 cmt. b ("The purpose of the reciprocity
provision ... is not to make it more difficult to secure recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments, but rather to create an incentive to foreign countries to commit to
recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered in the United States.").
13. The "recognition" of a judgment is conceptually distinct from the "enforcement"
of a judgment. A court "recognizes" a foreign judgment when it "relies on a foreign
proceeding to preclude relitigation of a particular claim or issue." Childs, supra note 4, at
222 n.9 (citing GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 936 (3d ed. 1996)). By contrast, a court "enforces" a judgment when it
"affirmatively requires the losing party in the foreign proceeding to satisfy the judgment."
Id. In the context of determining whether reciprocity does or does not exist, however, this
distinction is generally immaterial. Id. This Article generally refers to the "enforcement"
of judgments, but much of the analysis would apply with equal force to their
"recognition."
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There is, however, a more pessimistic vision of judgments
reciprocity. On this account, the decision by the United States to
adopt a reciprocity requirement will be met with a collective shrug by
states that currently refuse to enforce U.S. judgments.14 None of these
states will change their practice and, as a consequence, U.S.-judgment
creditors will derive no real benefit from the reciprocity
requirement." However, the administrative, fairness, and efficiency
costs associated with administering a regime based on reciprocity will
still be realized. Under this darker vision, adopting a policy of
judgments reciprocity is a fool's errand in which foreign-judgment
creditors suffer to no discernible end. 6
Which of these two visions is closer to the truth? That is the
question that this Article sets out to answer. It seeks to do so by
rigorously testing-apparently for the first time-the assumption that
foreign nations have a strong interest in having judgments rendered
by their national courts enforced in the United States." To do so, the
14. See Hulbert, supra note 9, at 653 ("[W]ill the introduction of a reciprocity
requirement achieve the hoped-for leverage to overcome the putative obstacles to
acceptance of American judgments abroad?").
15. This change to foreign state practice may occur in one of three ways. In situations
in which the barriers to recognizing U.S. judgments are legal in character, the foreign state
may remove these barriers by (1) enacting a statute that changes the general rules for
enforcing foreign judgments, or (2) entering into a judgments treaty with the United
States. In either case, the change must be approved by the legislature of the foreign state.
In situations in which the barriers to recognizing U.S. judgments are more informal,
governmental officials in the foreign state may remove these barriers by (3) taking steps to
ensure that domestic actors apply the law as written.
16. See Arthur Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the Law of Foreign Judgments: A Historical-
Critical Analysis, 16 LA. L. REV. 465, 482 (1956) ("[T]he insistence on reciprocity serves
only to mislead the forum by diverting its attention from the real question, that is, the
question of whether the judgment shows that the particular national had become the
victim of serious injustice." (citing Reese, supra note 4, at 793)); Comment, Reciprocity
and the Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 36 YALE L.J. 542, 548 (1927) ("Does
reciprocity help us ... to distinguish the wheat from the chaff? Obviously it does not. The
quality of a court does not depend upon the particular theory it may have as to recognition
of our judgments. . . .").
17. See Samuel P. Baumgartner, Understanding the Obstacles to the Recognition and
Enforcement of U.S. Judgments Abroad, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 965, 975 n.32 (2013)
("Whether, in fact, the reciprocity requirement has been [effective] in the two centuries or
more that it has been on the books ... is an empirical question that still needs to be
answered." (citing Dieter Martiny, Anerkennung auslandischer Entscheidungen nach
autonomem Recht, in III/1 HANDBUCH DES INTERNATIONALEN
ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHTS [MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE] at 575
(Paul Siebeck ed., 1984))); Hulbert, supra note 9, at 654 ("Will [reciprocity] work? Or will
it have negative consequences? Time alone will tell. . . ."). The absence of academic work
seeking to evaluate the efficacy of reciprocal legislation standing alone may be attributable
to the fact that the ALI statute was drafted against the backdrop of negotiations relating
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Article canvasses the historical record in search of instances in which
reciprocal legislation did, in fact, prompt foreign states to change
their laws. It identifies three such cases-drawn from a number of
jurisdictions across a wide range of time periods-and seeks to
ascertain whether they share any common elements. When viewed
collectively, the Article argues, these case studies suggest that foreign
state response to reciprocal legislation affecting private rights will be
driven largely by the reaction of interest groups within those states."
If actual and potential judgment creditors perceive their new inability
to enforce judgments in the United States as a serious threat to their
economic interests, for example, they may lobby for their home state
to enact legislation that reverses that state's practice of refusing to
enforce U.S. judgments. By contrast, if these individuals perceive an
inability to enforce judgments in the United States as only a minor
inconvenience, they will not undertake any lobbying effort and
foreign practice will not change. The key to evaluating the likely
success of any U.S. policy of judgments reciprocity, therefore, is to
determine what foreign-judgment creditors in the relevant states
stand to lose if this policy is adopted.
With this insight in mind, the Article then seeks to estimate the
size and scope of the losses that would be suffered by judgment
creditors in states that currently refuse to enforce U.S. judgments if
the United States were to adopt a policy of judgments reciprocity.
The results are not encouraging for the proponents of such a policy.
The data-drawn from a hand-collected dataset of federal
complaints, reported federal cases, and reported state cases involving
the enforcement of foreign judgments"-suggest that judgment
creditors in states that currently refuse to enforce U.S. judgments are
unlikely to suffer significant economic losses as a consequence of a
to the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments. One of the reasons why the
reciprocity provision was included in the draft statute was to give U.S. negotiators more
leverage in these negotiations. See Miller, supra note 4, at 290-91; Discussion of
International Jurisdiction and Judgments, 76 A.L.I. PRoC. 453, 454-55 (2000) (remarks of
Peter H. Pfund). Given this context, commentators were less focused on whether the
requirement, if adopted, would successfully incentivize foreign states to change their laws
in the event that the treaty negotiations failed to produce a comprehensive judgments
treaty. See infra notes 206-11 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between
the Hague Convention and the ALI's proposed statute).
18. For one of the very few articles exploring the role of interest groups in shaping
recognition doctrine, see Samuel P. Baumgartner, Is Transnational Litigation Different?,
25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1297, 1338-44 (2004) (discussing the role of interest groups in
shaping German recognition doctrine).
19. See Appendix.
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new U.S. reciprocity requirement. This suggests, in turn, that these
individuals are unlikely to respond to such a requirement by lobbying
their respective home state governments to change their laws. On
balance, the Article concludes that a policy of reciprocity along the
lines suggested by the ALI is unlikely to generate much in the way of
benefits for U.S.-judgment creditors. Given this policy's not
insignificant costs, therefore, its adoption is arguably not in the best
interests of the United States.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I defines the concept of
"reciprocity" and briefly identifies several types of reciprocal
legislation. Part II discusses the costs inherent to any legal regime
premised upon reciprocity and argues that such a regime can only be
justified if the benefits of such a regime exceed these costs. Part III
examines three historical examples in which one state used reciprocal
legislation-sometimes successfully, sometimes not-to bring about a
change in the law of another state. It then mines these examples for
insights into the conditions under which such legislation is likely to be
effective generally. Part IV draws upon these insights to develop a
framework for analyzing how other states would respond generally to
a decision by the United States to adopt a policy of judgments
reciprocity. Part V then uses this framework to evaluate how specific
foreign states would be likely to respond if the United States were to
adopt a policy of judgments reciprocity along the lines suggested by
the ALL.
I. RECIPROCAL LEGISLATION DEFINED
"Reciprocity" is a term susceptible to a variety of shadings and
interpretations.20 In this Article, the term "reciprocity" serves as
shorthand for a legal standard that defines the rights and privileges of
20. See MARK OSIEL, THE END OF RECIPROCITY: TERROR, TORTURE, AND THE
LAW OF WAR 17 (2009) ("Reciprocity is a concept that admits of several conceptions.");
Keith D. Yamauchi, Should Reciprocity Be a Part of the UNCITRAL Model Cross-Border
Insolvency Law?, 16 INT'L INSOLVENCY REV. 145, 146 (2007) ("[Reciprocity] does not
have a universal meaning."). Reciprocity is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as the "[t]he
mutual concession of advantages or privileges for purposes of commercial or diplomatic
relations." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1384 (9th ed. 2009); cf U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 493 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) ("The usual form
of reciprocal law is a statute passed by State Y, saying that any other State which accords
Y access to its courts for the enforcement of tax obligations likewise will have access to the
courts of Y.").
1116 [Vol. 92
2014] RETHINKING JUDGMENTS RECIPROCITY 1117
certain individuals with a connection to a foreign state.2 1 Unlike most
legal standards, the rights accorded by reciprocal legislation will vary
depending on the legal rules adopted by a particular foreign state.22 In
many cases, therefore, it will be necessary for courts to conduct
research into contemporary foreign state practice to determine what
rights, if any, are conferred by the reciprocal legislation at issue.
As a general matter, reciprocal legislation may be sorted into one
of three types: (1) legislation that affects state-to-state interactions,
(2) legislation that affects a state's interactions with private
individuals, and (3) legislation that affects interactions between
private individuals. First, legislators may choose to include a
reciprocity clause in legislation that addresses the rights of foreign-
state officials. Such legislation may, for example, spell out the rights
and immunities of diplomats.23 Alternatively, it may address the rights
and privileges accorded to foreign military personnel.2 4 In these cases,
21. In discussing reciprocity as a legal standard, scholars sometimes distinguish
between formal reciprocity and material reciprocity. See J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD
COPYRIGHT LAW 162-63 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing the distinction); William Patry, Choice
of Law and International Copyright, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 383, 404 & n.91 (2000) (same).
Under a standard of formal reciprocity, the enacting state will grant to a non-citizen
precisely the same rights and privileges that it grants to its own citizens, regardless of
whether the non-citizen's country of origin grants these rights to citizens of the enacting
state in actuality; this is the standard of "national treatment" frequently utilized in
international treaty making. See STERLING, supra, at 162-63. Under a standard of material
reciprocity, the enacting state will grant to a non-citizen only those rights and privileges
that the non-citizen's country of origin actually extends to the citizens of the home state in
practice; this is the standard that is typically utilized in reciprocal legislation. See id. at 163.
When the U.S. Congress enacts reciprocal legislation, therefore, it is directing courts to
apply a standard of material (rather than formal) reciprocity.
22. See Joseph R. Starr, Reciprocal and Retaliatory Legislation in the American States,
21 MINN. L. REV. 371, 374 (1937) ("[Rleciprocal legislation is a device whereby one state,
by legislative action, undertakes to secure for its citizens an advantage or an immunity by
granting that advantage or immunity to the citizens of any other state on condition that
the other state make a similar grant.").
23. See 22 U.S.C. § 254c (2012) (discussing reciprocity in the context of foreign
diplomats); see also id. § 4301(c) (discussing reciprocity in the context of foreign missions);
id. § 4304(b) (giving the Secretary of State discretionary power to determine what benefits
to give foreign missions on the basis of reciprocity); cf id. § 288f (discussing reciprocity
requirement as it relates to employees of international organizations). Reciprocity also
plays a role in determining the immunity enjoyed by high-ranking foreign officials through
long-held common-law principles. See Ingrid Wuerth, Pinochet's Legacy Reassessed, 106
AM. J. INT'L L. 731, 734 (2012). It does not, however, inform inquiries into the immunities
of foreign states as states. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
583, 90 Stat. 2891, 2892-93 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2012)) (making
no reference to any reciprocity requirement).
24. See 22 U.S.C. § 2559(b) ("[T]he Secretary of Defense may provide inpatient
medical care in the United States without cost to military personnel and their dependents
1118 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92
the impact of any reciprocity clause is felt not by private individuals,
but rather by the foreign state via its representatives.
Second, a legislature may choose to enact reciprocal legislation
that affects the enacting state's relationship with private citizens who
have some connection to a foreign state. The classic example of this
type of legislation relates to the taxation of certain income earned by
a resident of a foreign state.2 5 One may, however, find additional
examples of such legislation in areas as diverse as criminal law,26
commodities law,27 maritime law, 28 federal claims law,29 art law,30 and
from a foreign country if comparable care is made available to a comparable number of
United States military personnel and their dependents in that foreign country."). See
generally Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 365 (2009)
(discussing reciprocity in the context of international humanitarian law).
25. The Internal Revenue Code provides, for example, that gross income earned by
an individual resident of a foreign country from the international operation of a ship or an
aircraft shall be exempt from federal taxation in the United States "if such foreign country
grants an equivalent exemption to individual residents of the United States." 26 U.S.C.
§ 872(b)(1)-(2).
26. See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 374 (2005) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 546 (2000)) (observing that the statute at issue called "for
criminal enforcement of the customs laws of a foreign nation only when that nation has a
reciprocal law criminalizing smuggling into the United States").
27. See 7 U.S.C. § 18(c) (2012) ("[T]he Commission shall have authority to waive the
furnishing of a bond by a [person complaining of a violation of the Commodities Exchange
Act] who is a resident of a country which permits the filing of a complaint by a resident of
the United States without the furnishing of a bond.").
28. See 46 U.S.C. § 3303 (2006) ("A foreign certificate of inspection may be accepted
as evidence of lawful inspection only when presented by a vessel of a country that has by
its laws accorded to vessels of the United States visiting that country the same privileges
accorded to vessels of that country visiting the United States.").
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 2502(a) (2012) ("Citizens or subjects of any foreign government
which accords to citizens of the United States the right to prosecute claims against their
government in its courts may sue the United States in the United States Court of Federal
Claims if the subject matter of the suit is otherwise within such court's jurisdiction."). A
similar provision governs claims brought against the U.S. government under the Public
Vessels Act. See Public Vessels Act, Pub. L. No. 109-304, § 6(c), 120 Stat. 1485, 1522
(2006) (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 31111 (2006)) ("A national of a foreign country may not
maintain a civil action [in suits involving public vessels] unless it appears to the satisfaction
of the court in which the action is brought that the government of that country, in similar
circumstances, allows nationals of the United States to sue in its courts.").
30. See 19 U.S.C. § 2609(c)(1) (2012) ("In any action for forfeiture ... where the
claimant does not establish such title but establishes that it purchased the article for value
without knowledge or reason to believe it was stolen, forfeiture shall not be decreed unless
(A) the State Party to which the article is to be returned pays the claimant an amount
equal to the amount which the claimant paid for the article, or (B) the United States
establishes that such State Party, as a matter of law or reciprocity, would in similar
circumstances recover and return an article stolen from an institution in the United States
without requiring the payment of compensation.").
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consular law." In each case, the rights and privileges of these
individuals with respect to the enacting state are determined
according to a legal standard that takes into account the law and
practice of a particular foreign state.
Third, and finally, reciprocal legislation may work to determine
the legal rights of one private citizen vis-A-vis another private citizen.
The best-known example of this type of legislation relates to the
enforcement of foreign judgments.3 2 Reciprocal legislation of this type
may also be found, however, in intellectual property law33 and cross-
border insolvency law.34 In these cases, while the state clearly has
some interest in the scope and application of the legislation,35 the
31. See 8 U.S.C. § 1351 ("The fees for the furnishing and verification of applications
for visas by nonimmigrants of each foreign country and for the issuance of visas to
nonimmigrants of each foreign country shall be prescribed by the Secretary of State, if
practicable, in amounts corresponding to the total of all visa, entry, residence, or other
similar fees, taxes, or charges assessed or levied against nationals of the United States by
the foreign countries of which such nonimmigrants are nationals. . . .").
32. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-114 (2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 235, § 23A
(LexisNexis 2009); see also Genujo Lok Beteiligungs GmbH v. Zorn, 2008 ME 50, 1 24,
943 A.2d 573, 580-81 (observing that Germany considers reciprocity a mandatory
condition for recognizing a foreign-country judgment); Comm. on Foreign & Comparative
Law, Ass'n of the Bar of N.Y.C., Survey on Foreign Recognition of U.S. Money Judgments,
56 RECORD 378, 400-02 (2001) (noting existence of reciprocity requirements in Mexico
and Spain); Hideyuki Kobayashi & Yoshimasa Furuta, Products Liability Act and
Transnational Litigation in Japan, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 93, 117 (1999) ("Reciprocity is
another condition for the enforcement of foreign judgments in Japan."); Chenglin Liu,
The Obstacles of Outsourcing Imported Food Safety to China, 43 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 249,
270-71 (2010) ("In order to enforce a foreign judgment in China, Article 265 of the
Chinese Civil Procedure Law requires the existence of a treaty or reciprocity." (footnote
omitted)).
33. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) ("Any person whose country of origin ... extends
reciprocal [trademark] rights to nationals of the United States by law, shall be entitled to
the benefits of this section under the conditions expressed herein to the extent necessary
to give effect to any provision of such ... reciprocal law, in addition to the rights to which
any owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by this chapter.").
34. See Yamauchi, supra note 20, at 167-73 (discussing the use of reciprocity clauses
in cross-border insolvency legislation in Mexico and South Africa). In enacting its version
of the cross-border insolvency law, the United States decided not to insert a reciprocity
provision. See id. at 172.
35. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 1 ("[A] foreign judgment presented in the
United States for recognition or enforcement is an aspect of the relations between the
United States and the foreign state, even if the particular controversy that resulted in the
foreign judgment involves only private parties."); Childs, supra note 4, at 239-40
("Although the underlying dispute in a judgment recognition case is one between
individuals, we recognize today that the foreign court's judgment constitutes an exercise of
state power. So does the domestic court's decision to enforce or ignore that judgment.
Accordingly, a judgment recognition case does not encompass only a dispute between
individuals.").
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parties who are most directly affected by the reciprocity requirement
are private citizens.16  It is this third category of reciprocal
legislation-relating primarily to the rights of private citizens inter
se-that is the principal focus of the debate surrounding judgments
reciprocity and, hence, the principal focus of this Article.
II. THE COSTS OF JUDGMENTS RECIPROCITY
Critics of reciprocity have advanced a number of objections to its
use in the judgments context.37 Some critics maintain that the judicial
costs of administering reciprocal legislation are simply too great.
Others argue that it is unfair to hold foreign litigants responsible for
actions taken by their governments. Still others oppose reciprocity
requirements on efficiency grounds. Each of these critiques is well
founded in many respects. At the same time, the mere fact that a
reciprocity requirement may be costly is not enough, by itself, to
conclude it should not be used. In order to fully assess the merits of
adopting a policy of reciprocity, the known costs of reciprocity must
be weighed against its potential benefits. To date, however, the critics
have focused almost exclusively on its costs, which are discussed at
some length below.
A. Administrability
One longstanding critique of reciprocal legislation in the
judgments context is that it imposes a heavy burden on judges. In a
legal regime premised on reciprocity, judges must look to foreign
state practice to determine what rights (if any) these states grant to
citizens of the judge's home state in order to determine what rights (if
any) the judge should grant to citizens of the foreign state.38 The fact-
36. See Yaad Rotem, The Problem of Selective or Sporadic Recognition: A New
Economic Rationale for the Law of Foreign Country Judgments, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 505,
521 (2010) ("The recognition of foreign judgments thus becomes a private matter, which
concerns the two litigating parties. Governments generally do not perceive these as
questions of international relationships.").
37. See, e.g., In re Wilde, A.3d 749, 763 n.21 (D.C. 2013) ("The reciprocity doctrine
has been widely criticized . . . ." (quoting Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 867 n.21 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Friedrich K. Juenger, A Hague Judgments
Convention?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 111, 113 (1998) (suggesting that reciprocity is an "ill-
conceived notion").
38. See Brand, supra note 4, at 281-83. The problem of renvoi-the analytical hall of
mirrors that would arise if both nations required a showing of reciprocity-presents
another challenge to judicial administrability. See id. at 282-83. This problem may be
substantially alleviated, however, simply by allocating the burden of proof to the party
seeking to avoid enforcement. See Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial Is Our Need for
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finding challenges inherent in such an inquiry have led some scholars
to argue that judges lack the capacity to administer reciprocal
legislation effectively.39 In the words of one scholar, "judicial
examination of the observance of material reciprocity has proved
clumsy, if not unworkable."0
There is little question that a legislative regime premised on
reciprocity can impose a heavy burden on judges. There are, however,
a number of ways in which this burden may be lightened. First, the
problem of proving reciprocity could be addressed via expert
testimony.4' Indeed, this is the means by which the issue is often
addressed in the U.S. states that have already adopted a policy of
judgments reciprocity as a matter of state law.42 To be sure, the use of
experts is not ideal from the litigants' perspective because it shifts the
costs of determining foreign state practice to them. It also raises the
possibility of inconsistent judicial decisions based on the
persuasiveness of different experts. One can imagine a scenario, for
example, in which a Georgia court and a Massachusetts court reach
different conclusions as to whether a particular foreign state's
a Judgments-Recognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 167, 178 (1998); see also AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, § 7(b) (assigning
the burden of proof to the "party resisting recognition or enforcement").
39. See Miller, supra note 4, at 304 ("The collection of data and evaluation of judicial
motives required [pursuant to a reciprocity provision] will either cripple U.S. courts, or
encourage them to engage in inequitable evidentiary short cuts."); Reese, supra note 4, at
793 ("The [reciprocity] doctrine would obviously place an onerous burden on the courts,
since it would frequently be difficult to determine the effect which the courts of a
particular nation do in fact accord to the judgments rendered in this country."); Rotem,
supra note 36, at 530 ("[B]ecause of the problem of asymmetric information, the forum
cannot ascertain whether or not the foreign country, a judgment of which it is considering
for recognition, is applying a selective or sporadic recognition regime with regard to
judgments rendered by the forum."); see also Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya), 492 F.
Supp. 885, 899 (N.D. Tex. 1980) ("[T]he reciprocity rule is difficult to apply ... because
courts are ill-equipped to determine foreign law."); cf. Brand, supra note 4, at 281-83
(discussing administrative challenges faced by foreign courts seeking to determine U.S.
practice for reciprocity purposes).
40. Arthur Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U. L.
REV. 752,778 (1955).
41. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, § 7 cmt. e. See generally Matthew J. Wilson,
Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening the Door to a
Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887 (2011) (discussing methods
by which U.S. courts may better ascertain and apply foreign law).
42. See infra note 71 and accompanying text (explaining that Georgia and
Massachusetts courts require foreign-judgment creditors to prove reciprocity as a
precondition to enforcing foreign judgments); see also AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, § 7
cmt. e ("The law or practice of the courts of the state of origin may be demonstrated by ...
expert testimony .... ").
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practice satisfies the relevant reciprocity requirement.43 Nevertheless,
to the extent that one is concerned about the capacity of judges to
determine foreign state practice, the use of expert testimony offers
one possible means of addressing that concern.
Alternatively, a legislature could delegate to the executive
branch the task of determining foreign state practice and of keeping a
list of states that recognize U.S. judgments. A number of foreign
nations-including Austria, Denmark, and Singapore-have adopted
precisely this approach." This approach has also been followed by the
United States in areas outside of the judgments context,45 and the
ALI gave it serious consideration when preparing its draft statute. 46 If
a legislature were to adopt this approach, it would likewise alleviate
to a significant extent critics' concerns about judicial capacity to
manage a statutory regime premised on reciprocity, albeit at the cost
of shifting the burden to the Department of State. 47 The task of
43. Cf Jacob Chaitkin, The Rights of Residents of Russia and Its Satellites to Share in
the Estates of American Decedents, 25 S. CAL. L. REV. 297, 311-12 (1952) (discussing
conflicting California decisions as to whether reciprocal rights existed in context of
inheritance statutes). This cost is implicit in any legal regime premised on material
reciprocity; the essence of such a requirement is that a court must conduct a separate
inquiry in each new case. See Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 250 ("A ruling [on reciprocity]
in a specific case creates no legally binding precedent, as the principle of stare decisis does
not obtain."); cf William B. Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof,
45 CAL L. REV. 23, 28 (1957) ("The treatment of foreign law as a fact for purposes of
pleading, proof, and appeal deprives the holdings on foreign law of one court from
becoming rules which control the decisions of other courts under the rule of stare
decisis.").
44. See Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 249 (Austria and Denmark); Margaret A. Dale,
Proskauer on International Litigation and Arbitration, Ch. 18 Recognition & Enforcement
of Judgments, PROSKAUER (2011), http://www.proskauerguide.com/litigation/18/III
(Singapore).
45. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 60503(a) (2006) ("On receiving satisfactory proof from the
government of a foreign country that it has suspended, in any part, the imposition of
discriminating duties for any class of vessels owned by citizens of the United States or
goods imported in those vessels, the President may proclaim a reciprocal suspension of
discriminating duties for the same class of vessels owned by citizens of that country or
goods imported in those vessels.").
46. See AM. LAW INST., RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE § 5(c) (Council Draft No. 1,
2001) ("The Secretary of State is directed to maintain and publish (i) a list of foreign states
that accord recognition and enforcement to judgments rendered in the United States; and
(ii) a list of foreign states that do not accord recognition and enforcement to judgments
rendered in the United States."). Ultimately, the ALI decided not to follow this approach
in the final version of the draft legislation. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, § 7(e).
47. There exists, of course, the possibility that the Department of State will bow to
political pressure to keep certain states on the "approved" list even if their courts refuse to
enforce U.S. judgments. This problem is, however, surmountable. The list could, for
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determining foreign practice, under this approach, would be the
responsibility of the executive branch rather than the judiciary.
Finally, a U.S. court system could enhance its capacity to
administer a regime premised on reciprocity by working to develop
cooperative relationships with foreign judges. In 2010, for example,
the state court system of New York entered a memorandum of
understanding with the court system of New South Wales, Australia.4 8
Pursuant to this agreement, New York judges gained the ability to
certify certain questions relating to Australian law to judges in New
South Wales on an informal basis.49 The judges in New South Wales,
in return, gained the ability to do the same to New York judges with
respect to New York law.so If agreements such as this were widely
replicated, then the task of determining foreign state law (and, to a
lesser extent, foreign state practice) in connection with a reciprocity
provision would become less difficult."' This, too, would alleviate the
concerns of those critics who have expressed misgivings about the
judicial costs of administering such a regime.
These various mitigation strategies notwithstanding, any
legislative regime based on reciprocity carries with it certain
administrative costs.52 While these costs may be mitigated, or shifted
to other institutional actors, they cannot be eliminated because such
legislation by definition requires some actor to determine the precise
character of foreign state practice at a particular moment in time.
These costs are therefore an inescapable part of any rule of
reciprocity.
B. Unfairness
Another common critique of requiring reciprocity in the
judgments context is that it is unfair to private litigants. Critics argue
example, function as a rebuttable presumption. The burden would then be on the litigant
challenging the conclusion to prove otherwise.
48. Press Release, State of N.Y. Unified Court Sys., First of Its Kind Memorandum of
Understanding Signed Between U.S. State Court and Australian Court (Oct. 28, 2010),
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/press/pr2010_14.shtml.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See generally Wilson, supra note 41 (discussing methods by which U.S. courts may
better ascertain and apply foreign law).
52. See Yuliya Zeynalova, The Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments: Is It Broken and How Do We Fix It?, 31 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 150, 203 (2013)
(observing that a reciprocity requirement "increases the time, cost, and uncertainty of the
entire .. . recognition process").
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that the effect of such a requirement will not be felt by the foreign
government that refuses to enforce U.S. judgments but, rather, by
individuals seeking to enforce foreign judgments. These critics
maintain that it is unfair to require these individuals to bear the costs
of relitigating a particular dispute because they have no control over
government policy.53 In the words of the drafters of the Restatement
(Second) on Conflict of Laws: "Private parties ... should not be made
to suffer for the fact that the courts of the state from which they come
give insufficient consideration to the interests of the state of the
forum."5 4
It is true that a reciprocity requirement will sometimes make it
impossible for a litigant to enforce a foreign judgment. It is also true
that the reason for this incapacity will often lie with decisions made
by a particular government rather than with any fault of the party or
even the foreign court that rendered the judgment. It is not always
the case, however, that private actors lack the ability to influence
government policy.55 Foreign litigants who find themselves unable to
enforce judgments rendered by courts in their home state as a result
of a U.S. reciprocity requirement will have a powerful motivation to
lobby for a change in that state's policy. Since the primary purpose of
a reciprocity requirement is to bring about a change in foreign state
practice, the unfair treatment inflicted on these litigants may serve to
align their interests with those of the United States. Viewed from the
perspective of the enacting state, therefore, the fact that a reciprocity
53. See William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 161,
219-20 (2002) ("While governments can protect their interests by negotiating treaties for
reciprocal enforcement, private plaintiffs cannot."); Hulbert, supra note 9, at 653 ("The
party thus deprived of rights under the foreign judgment is penalized, not for any cause for
which that party is responsible, but because the American court refusing enforcement
decides that some hypothetical American judgment in some other hypothetical case would
not, or might not, be enforced by (some or all of the) courts in the country of origin.");
Friedrich K. Juenger, Private International Law and the German Legislature, in THE
INTERNATIONAL LAWYER: FREUNDESGABE FUR WULF H. DOSER 623, 625 (Friedrich
Kumubler et al. eds., 1999) ("It [is] blatantly unfair to make private parties the whipping
boys for perceived inadequacies of foreign legal systems."); Miller, supra note 4, at 299
(discussing the "inherent unfairness of punishing litigants for national policies over which
they have no control"); Reese, supra note 4, at 793 ("[T]he creditor is not to blame for the
fact that the state of rendition does not accord conclusive effect to American judgments,
and it might well be thought unfair to rob him on this account of the essential advantages
of his judgment."). But see Ballard, supra note 9, at 237 (arguing that reciprocity clause is
fair because other nations routinely utilize such clauses in the enforcement of judgments
context).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. k (1971).
55. See infra Part III (providing examples of such private-actor influence).
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requirement holds private foreign citizens accountable for their
government's policy choices-thereby giving them an incentive to
lobby for policy changes-may be a positive feature of such
legislation rather than a flaw. Whether these citizens are, in fact,
likely to lobby for such a change is a question taken up in Part V.
C. Inefficiency
A final criticism holds that judgments reciprocity is inefficient.56
This argument suggests that it is wasteful for one state to insist upon
reciprocity because this insistence will require the parties to litigate
their dispute all over again in the second jurisdiction." One
commentator has argued, for example, that "by not respecting foreign
decisions because reciprocity is lacking, courts thwart the valuable
goal of putting an end to litigation" and that "[i]f these decisions were
recognized, courts would save themselves and the parties both time
and resources."58
There is no doubt that the imposition of a reciprocity
requirement could generate inefficiency in the short run to the extent
that it forces foreign-judgment creditors to re-litigate suits in the
United States. It is important to remember, however, that a rule of
reciprocity would only operate to bar a U.S. court from enforcing a
foreign judgment in cases where the rendering state was refusing to
enforce U.S. judgments. The imposition of a reciprocity requirement,
therefore, merely imposes upon foreign-judgment creditors the same
inefficiencies currently borne by U.S.-judgment creditors seeking to
enforce U.S. judgments in foreign states. If the imposition of a
reciprocity requirement ultimately prompts this foreign state to
change its laws to recognize U.S. judgments, then there would be net
efficiency gains because judgment creditors from both states would
thereafter be able to enforce judgments rendered by courts in the
56. See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, The Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 4 (1988) ("To retry cases that have been
authoritatively decided violates fundamental tenets of judicial economy."); Miller, supra
note 4, at 315.
57. Discussion of International Jurisdiction and Judgments Project, 77 A.L.I. PROC.
201, 223 (2001) (remarks of Patrick J. Borchers, Dean, Creighton Univ. Sch. of Law) ("I
think it would be a very poor idea to tell our courts that we have to relitigate a matter that
we have determined has been fairly tried in a foreign forum just in an effort to implement
policies entirely external to those litigants. It seems to me that that would be a waste of
our resources and their resources as well."); Hulbert, supra note 9, at 646 ("[A reciprocity
requirement] will necessarily lead to duplicate litigation. . .
58. Southard, supra note 4, at 349.
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other.5 9 It is possible, in other words, that a short-term decrease in
efficiency attributable to a reciprocity requirement could ultimately
lead to a dramatic increase in efficiency in the long run if that
requirement prompts the foreign state to begin enforcing U.S.
judgments.
The costs outlined above-administrative costs, fairness costs,
and efficiency costs-are the primary reasons why many scholars
argue that the United States should not adopt a policy of judgments
reciprocity. To date, however, critics of such a policy have generally
dismissed or otherwise discounted the potential benefits that such a
policy might achieve. However, if adopting a policy of judgments
reciprocity is likely to prompt many foreign states that currently
refuse to enforce U.S. judgments to reverse course, then the policy's
benefits may well exceed its costs. The question of whether a
reciprocity requirement is, in fact, likely to bring about any
meaningful change in foreign state practice is taken up in the next
three Parts.
III. RECIPROCAL LEGISLATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The question of whether a reciprocity requirement is likely to
prompt another state to change its laws-whether reciprocity works-
has attracted surprisingly little attention in the academic literature to
date. It is not uncommon for articles on the topic of judgments
reciprocity to ignore altogether the question of its efficacy.'o In the
articles that consider the issue, however, the consensus is that
reciprocity requirements do not work.61 The conventional wisdom
59. To understand why this is so, recall that a reciprocity requirement will be most
salient when a court in the foreign state is refusing to enforce judgments rendered by
courts in the enacting state. In these cases, judgment creditors from the enacting state are
already being forced to re-litigate disputes abroad, which is itself an inefficient outcome.
To the extent that a reciprocity requirement imposes similar inefficiencies on judgment
creditors located in the foreign state, then there will be a net decrease in efficiency in the
short run but there is also a possible increase in efficiency in the long run if the foreign
state revises its policy.
60. See, e.g., Lenhoff, supra note 16, at 482 (critiquing judgments reciprocity without
discussing efficacy); Southard, supra note 4, at 345-49 (same); cf Yamauchi, supra note 20,
at 179 (criticizing the practice of attaching reciprocity clauses to cross-border insolvency
legislation but not addressing the question of such clauses' efficacy).
61. See, e.g., Hulbert, supra note 9, at 654-55 (doubting the efficacy of reciprocity);
Miller, supra note 4, at 293 (same); cf. Peter Child Nosek, Unifying Maritime Claims
Against the United States: A Proposal to Repeal the Suits in Admiralty Act and the Public
[Vol. 921126
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among academics is that these requirements are unlikely to prompt
other states to change their ways.
The precise origins of this conventional wisdom, however, are
frustratingly elusive. In many cases, scholars and judges writing on
this topic simply assert, without evidence, that reciprocity
requirements are ineffective. In a classic article, for example, Arthur
von Mehren and Donald Trautman noted the prevailing academic
view that a rule of reciprocity "has little if any constructive effect"
and that it "tends instead to a general breakdown of recognition
practice."6 2 In these and other instances in which such claims are
made, one would expect to find, at a minimum, anecdotal evidence to
support the claim that reciprocity requirements do not work. Instead,
one finds citations to academic writers who, frustratingly, likewise fail
to cite any historical evidence-anecdotal or otherwise-to support
this proposition.63
The absence of historical examples in support of the
conventional wisdom does not, of course, mean that the wisdom is
wrong. It does mean, however, that it is past time for a careful inquiry
into whether, and under what circumstances, reciprocal legislation
Vessels Act, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 41, 54 (1999) (arguing that reciprocity clause in Public
Vessels Act is an "inadequate instrument for effective coercion").
62. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 4, at 1661. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota has also expressed "serious doubt" that a reciprocity requirement will in fact
"encourag[e] foreign nations to enforce United States judgments." Nicol v. Tanner, 256
N.W.2d 796, 801 (Minn. 1976); see also Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya), 492 F. Supp.
885, 899 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (suggesting that reciprocity "tends ... to a general breakdown
of recognition practice" (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 4, at 1661)).
63. Von Mehren and Trautman cite to three sources in support of the proposition
quoted above. The first provides no direct support for it. See von Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 4, at 1661 (citing ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 166 (1962)). The second discusses the possibility that some foreign nations will
undertake "reprisals" against U.S. judgments as the result of a reciprocity requirement.
See id. (citing Kurt H. Nadelmann, Reprisals Against American Judgments?, 65 HARV. L.
REV. 1184, 1185 (1959)). A careful review of this second source reveals, however, that the
"reprisals" at issue were merely considered (not actually adopted) and were considered
only by a single country (France). See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Reprisals Against American
Judgments?, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1184, 1191 (1959) (noting the reprisals were a "French
proposal"). The third source supports the proposition but only cites the second source
(Nadelmann) as an authority. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 4, at 1661 (citing
ROBERT A. LEFLAR, THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 132 & n.19 (1959)). The Supreme
Court of Minnesota, which has also expressed skepticism as to the efficacy of judgments
reciprocity, cites to an article which, again, cites to Kurt Nadelmann's 1959 article and von
Mehren and Trautman's 1968 article in support of the proposition. See Nicol, 256 N.W.2d
at 801 (citing Alan E. Golomb, Recognition of Foreign Money Judgments: A Goal-
Oriented Approach, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 604, 616 (1969)). At no point, in short, do any
of these critics ever offer any firm evidence to support their view.
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will have its intended effect. In recent years, a number of scholars
have attempted such a study by turning to game theory." These
studies, while generating some insights, are highly abstract.' They
also pay little attention to the social and historical context in which
reciprocal legislation has been effective in the past and make a
number of unrealistic assumptions.6 6 It would be useful, therefore, to
64. For attempts to use game theory to determine whether a state should adopt a
policy of judgments reciprocity, see Sunghoon Lee, Game of Foreign Judgment
Recognition, 3 ASIA L. REV. 101, 133 (2006) (relying on game theory to describe the use of
reciprocity requirements as "foolish" and to argue that such requirements are "not the
most effective means to draw recognition from the foreign countries"); Antonio F. Perez,
The International Recognition of Judgments: The Debate Between Private and Public Law
Solutions, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 44, 60 (2001) ("It is possible such [a tit-for-tat] strategy
[premised on a reciprocity requirement], if maintained, would have resulted in the
widespread recognition and enforcement of U.S. judgments in Europe."); Susan L.
Stevens, Commanding International Judicial Respect: Reciprocity and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 26 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 115, 117 (2002)
("From a game theory perspective, a statute that requires reciprocity is always superior to
a statute that does not include such a requirement."); cf Francesco Parisi & Nina Ghei,
The Role of Reciprocity in International Law, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 93, 109-18 (2003)
(using game theory to analyze various topics in the area of public international law). For
attempts to use game theory to determine whether a state should enforce the judgments of
another state more generally, see MICHAEL J. WHINCOP & MARY KEYES, POLICY AND
PRAGMATISM IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 158 (2001); Ronald A. Brand, Recognition of
Foreign Judgments as a Trade Law Issue: The Economics of Private International Law, in
ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMPARATIVE AND EMPIRICAL
PERSPECTIVES 592, 625 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1997); Dodge, supra
note 53, at 224-25; Mark D. Rosen, Should "Un-American" Foreign Judgments Be
Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783, 808 (2004); Michael Whincop, The Recognition Scene:
Game Theoretic Issues in the Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 416,
421-22 (1999).
65. The games in these studies, for example, typically use a standard payoff structure
that fails to account for the fact that different states are likely to react to a reciprocity
requirement in very different ways. See Lee, supra note 64, at 120 & n.71 (stating that the
Stevens article "ignored" this possibility); cf ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION 17 (1984) (observing that "[t]he payoffs of a player need [to] be
measured relative to each another").
66. The Stevens study concluded, for example, that the United States should adopt a
policy of judgments reciprocity based on an analysis which assumed that (1) actors in the
United States could not communicate with actors in other states, (2) the gains and losses
accruing to individuals in the United States and other nations under a reciprocity regime
would be essentially equal, and (3) the "game" would be played exactly once. Stevens,
supra note 64, at 141, 157; cf Lee, supra note 64, at 120 n.71 (criticizing the assumption
that gains and losses will be roughly equal). See generally DONALD P. GREEN & IAN
SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF
APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 91 (1994) ("[G]ames that are similar in
mathematical form, and thus expected to produce similar outcomes, produce levels of
cooperation that vary considerably with the social context in which they take place.");
ROGER A. MCCAIN, GAME THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 6 (2009) (noting that the
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obtain more information about past examples of successful (and
unsuccessful) reciprocal legislation to develop a deeper and richer
understanding of the circumstances in which such legislation is likely
to work.
Such an inquiry is, however, more complicated than it may
appear at first glance. In the United States, for example, the Supreme
Court adopted a reciprocity requirement with respect to foreign
judgments in 1895 as a matter of general federal common law in the
case of Hilton v. Guyot.67 The Court then cast aside this rule (along
with the rest of general federal common law) in 1938 in the case of
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.6 In theory, therefore, one might seek to
determine whether the imposition of a reciprocity requirement by the
U.S. federal courts during this time period led foreign states to be
more receptive to U.S. judgments. The problem with such an
approach is that this particular rule of reciprocity applied exclusively
to the federal courts; state courts were not bound by it.6 9 Throughout
this period, foreign-judgment creditors were thus able to enforce their
judgments in state courts without needing to satisfy any reciprocity
requirement.7 0 Accordingly, the rule applied by the U.S. federal
courts in the span of time between 1895 and 1938 does not offer any
real insight into the efficacy of a reciprocity requirement in the
judgments context.
simplifying assumptions made by game theory "mean that most cooperative game theory
is not applicable to very many problems of public policy").
67. 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895).
68. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
69. See John Norton Moore, Federalism and Federal Relations, 1965 DUKE L.J. 248,
255 ("Since some of our largest states with the greatest amount of foreign commerce have
rejected the Hilton reciprocity rule, other reciprocity rule and even non-enforcement rule
nations have many of their judgments enforced in this country without the necessity of a
treaty." (footnote omitted)).
70. See, e.g., Johnson v. Compagnie G6n6rale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 123
(N.Y. 1926) (enforcing a French judgment notwithstanding lack of reciprocity). During
this period, the defendant could, of course, have sought to remove the case to federal
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Nationalizing
International Law: Essay in Honor of Louis Henkin, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 121,
128 (1997). If the enforcement action was brought in a state of the United States of which
the defendant was a resident, however, removal would not have been permitted. See
Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, 1094 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b)(2) (2012)) ("Any other suit of a civil nature ... may be removed into the district
court of the United States for the proper district by the defendant or defendants therein,
being nonresidents of that state." (emphasis added)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2012)
("A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of [diversity] jurisdiction ... may
not be removed if any of the ... defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought.").
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Alternatively, one might look to the experience of the U.S. states
that have already adopted a policy of judgments reciprocity as a
matter of state law. In the 1960s and 1970s, for example, two U.S.
states-Georgia and Massachusetts-enacted legislation that requires
foreign-judgment creditors to prove reciprocity as a precondition to
enforcing foreign judgments. While the imposition of a reciprocity
requirement by these two states could conceivably prompt foreign
states to rethink their willingness to enforce U.S. judgments more
generally, neither Massachusetts nor Georgia is likely to be viewed as
sufficiently important from the point of view of foreign nations to
prompt any significant change in their general judgments recognition
policy. 72 This fact, along with the ability of foreign-judgment creditors
to obtain recognition of foreign judgments in one of the remaining
forty-eight states that lack any mandatory reciprocity requirement
and then enforce the resulting judgment in another state pursuant to
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, likewise makes it difficult (if not
impossible) to draw any definitive conclusions as to the impact of
these two states' reciprocity requirements on foreign state practice.7 3
These challenges notwithstanding, there are a number of
historical examples in which reciprocal legislation did, in fact, have a
documented impact upon another state. This Part identifies and
discusses three such examples. It first discusses how reciprocal
legislation enacted by Germany led California to amend its foreign-
judgment law in the aftermath of the San Francisco Earthquake of
1906. It then examines how the United States used reciprocal
legislation to induce other states to recognize an intellectual property
right in semiconductor design during the mid-1980s. Finally, it
71. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-114 (2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 235, § 23A
(LexisNexis 2009).
72. In 2012, exports from Massachusetts accounted for 1.7% of all U.S exports, State
Exports for Massachusetts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/statistics/state/datalma.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2014), while exports from Georgia
accounted for 2.3%, State Exports for Georgia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/state/data/ga.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2014).
73. See Gregory H. Shill, Ending Judgment Arbitrage: Jurisdictional Competition and
the Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the United States, 54 HARV. INT'L L.J.
459, 475-76 (2013) (questioning the effectiveness of state-specific recognition criteria by
noting the ability of foreign-judgment holders to obtain recognition of the judgment in a
U.S. state with lax recognition criteria and then to enforce the new "U.S." judgment in a
state with stricter criteria by means of the Full Faith and Credit Clause). But see Reading
& Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp., 976 S.W.2d 702, 714-15 (Tex. App. 1998)
(refusing to recognize and enforce a Canadian judgment previously recognized by a state
court in Louisiana).
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explores how the European Union attempted to use reciprocal
legislation to persuade other states to grant sui generis intellectual
property protection to databases during the late-1990s.
When viewed collectively, these case studies suggest that the key
to predicting how a particular state will respond to a particular piece
of reciprocal legislation affecting private rights is to evaluate how
interest groups within that state are likely to react to the legislation.7 4
In some ways, this insight is unsurprising. The legal academy has
looked to theories of interest-group politics for decades in order to
explain various aspects of the legislative process." Indeed, the notion
that legislative outcomes will be driven in many cases not by
disinterested legislators acting in the public interest but rather by
active lobbying by interest groups with a stake in the outcome is
widely accepted.76 To date, however, scholars writing about the
efficacy of reciprocal legislation have devoted virtually no time or
attention to the role of these groups." The case studies below
illustrate the costs of this inattention and pave the way for a better
74. This account is generally consistent with what is known in the political science
literature as interest-group theory. Interest-group theory is a branch of public choice
theory that "seeks to explain governmental behavior on the basis of the costs of organizing
interest groups." Robert B. Ekeland, Jr. & Robert D. Tollison, The Interest-Group Theory
of Government, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO PUBLIC CHOICE 357, 357 (William F.
Shughart II & Laura Razzolini eds., 2001). The essence of interest-group theory has been
described as follows:
Small, homogeneous groups with strong communities of interest tend to be more
effective suppliers of political pressure and political support (votes, campaign
contributions, and the like) than larger groups whose interests are more diffuse.
The members of smaller groups have greater individual stakes in favorable policy
decisions, can organize at lower cost, and can more successfully control the free
riding that otherwise would undermine the achievement of their collective goals.
William F. Shughart II, Public Choice, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS
427,429 (David R. Henderson ed., 2008).
75. See, e.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 35-44 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEx. L. REV.
469,469 (1987).
76. See supra notes 74-75.
77. Scholars have discussed the role of domestic interest groups more generally in the
context of "two-level games" that take place at both the domestic and the international
levels. See Andrew Moravcsik, Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic
Theories of International Bargaining, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL
BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 3, 14-17 (Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson &
Robert D. Putnam eds., 1993); Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The
Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427, 433-35 (1988).
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understanding of when reciprocal legislation affecting private rights is
likely to have its intended effect.78
A. Case Studies
1. The San Francisco Earthquake of 1906
In the late nineteenth century, Germany enacted legislation
directing its courts to refuse to enforce foreign judgments rendered by
states that did not enforce German judgments as a means of
incentivizing foreign states to recognize these judgments.79 The law
achieved a spectacular success when it prompted the state of
California to amend its laws relating to the enforcement of foreign
judgments in the years following the San Francisco Earthquake of
1906.
The earthquake caused massive property losses across much of
Northern California; contemporary estimates of the total losses
78. This is not to suggest that theories of legislative action based on interest-group
politics are without their weaknesses. Critics of this approach have argued that it
"generally works better in supplying after-the-fact explanations than in predicting the
future." See Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275,
281; cf STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 388 n.38 (1982) (noting that
although interest-group theories may help explain the origins of regulation in certain
industries, "[tihey cannot fully explain environmental, health, safety regulation, or even
traditional utility and transportation regulation"). This critique would hold that while
interest-group theory may be helpful in explaining the outcomes of reciprocal legislation
retrospectively, it would be folly to attempt to use it prospectively to guess at a state's
likely response to such legislation. See GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 66, at 9 (arguing
that public-choice theorists are too willing to advance ambitious normative proposals
based on thin evidence). There are several responses to this critique. The first is that it is
odd to argue that factors that are concededly explanatory ex post should not be considered
relevant ex ante. While one must always be cautious when seeking to guess at future
outcomes, the fact that interest groups will likely play some role in determining any
legislative response to a piece of reciprocal legislation is one that should not be
disregarded. While it is doubtless true that using interest-group theory is not a crystal ball
that is capable of predicting the future, this is not in itself a reason to disregard the
importance of interest groups in shaping outcomes. Moreover, the fact that other theories
purport to offer a definitive answer to the question of efficacy is not itself a reason to
prefer them. The legislative process is complex. In the context of reciprocal legislation, it is
even more so because one is seeking to guess at the likely response to such legislation in
multiple foreign jurisdictions, each with a political system that is unique and idiosyncratic.
While there is virtue in seeking to abstract away from these complexities, there is also the
risk that simplifying the problem will generate false certainty as to its likely outcome.
Interest-group theory, to its credit, embraces these complexities rather than assuming
them away.
79. See Wolfgang Wurmnest, Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Money Judgments
in Germany, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 175, 179-81 (2005).
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ranged from $133 million to $296 million.so A number of individuals
and businesses that suffered losses held insurance policies issued by
German insurance companies and, in the aftermath of the
earthquake, sought to recover their losses by filing claims." In many
cases, the German insurers refused to pay, arguing that the insurance
contracts at issue clearly stipulated that the insurer was not liable for
damage caused by earthquakes.' In response, the policyholders
argued that the damage in question was, in fact, caused by fire, which
was covered under the relevant policies."
The courts of California ultimately resolved a number of these
disputes in the policyholders' favor.' When the policyholders sought
to enforce these judgments in Germany, however, they found
themselves stymied by the German reciprocity requirement.85 In a
famous case decided in 1907, the German Imperial Court surveyed
California law and concluded that the courts of California were
unlikely to enforce a judgment rendered by a German court."
Consequently, that court held that the California judgments won by
the policyholders could not be enforced in Germany."
In the wake of this decision, an organization known as the
Policyholders' Protective League announced that it would lobby for a
change in California's laws as they related to foreign judgments."
This organization-which was formed in 1906 to represent the
interests of members of the San Francisco Merchants' Association,
the Chamber of Commerce, and the Board of Trade, among
others89-Sent representatives to "ask[] the Legislature to amend the
Code of Civil Procedure regarding the effect of foreign judgments [in
80. TILMANN J. RODER, FROM INDUSTRIAL TO LEGAL STANDARDIZATION, 1871-
1914: TRANSNATIONAL INSURANCE LAW AND THE GREAT SAN FRANCISCO
EARTHQUAKE 74 (Frederik Heinemann trans., 2012).
81. See id. at 88-89.
82. See id. at 81-88.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 88.
85. See Wurmnest, supra note 79, at 186.
86. Id. at 186-87 ("In 1907, the German Imperial Court decided that because
reciprocity was not assured with California, it could not enforce default judgments
obtained from California courts by parties damaged in the 1906 San Francisco
earthquake.").
87. Id. at 186.
88. See RODER, supra note 80, at 75-77 (discussing the Policyholders' Protective
League).
89. See id. at 75.
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California]."I This lobbying effort soon bore fruit. On March 5, 1907,
the California legislature unanimously approved legislation that
would liberalize the state's laws relating to the enforcement of foreign
judgments.9 1 One assemblyman helpfully explained that "the measure
was designed to help insurance claimants."' On March 11, 1907, the
Governor signed the bill.93
The original law had stated that the state's courts could refuse to
enforce a foreign judgment if the foreign court lacked jurisdiction, if
there was a lack of proper notice to the parties, if there was fraud, or
if the judgment in question contained a clear mistake of law or fact.94
The revised law, by contrast, stipulated that a California court could
refuse to enforce a foreign judgment only if the foreign court lacked
jurisdiction." To the extent that Germany's reciprocity requirement
was intended to prompt other states to amend their laws to make it
easier to enforce German judgments, this goal was clearly realized
here. There can be little doubt that the relevant amendments to the
California Civil Code made it easier to enforce German judgments in
California.
There can also be little doubt that interest-group lobbying played
a key role in bringing about the change to the California law.
California policyholders-represented by the Policyholders
Protective League-stood to gain a great deal if the California law
was changed. A successful campaign to change the law, if deemed
sufficient by the German courts, would mean that judgments already
won in California could be enforced against the assets held by the
insurance companies in Germany. A failed campaign would mean
90. See Editorial, Judgments on Foreign Fire Insurance, S.F. CALL, Feb. 25, 1907, at 6.
91. See Foreign Judgments Are Given Recognition, S.F. CALL, Mar. 5, 1907, at 2
("Senator Leavitt's bill making the judgments of foreign courts good in California passed
the Assembly without opposition today and is now on its way to the Governor.").
92. Id.
93. Act of Mar. 11, 1907, ch. 178, 1907 Cal. Stat. 206 (codified at CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1915 (repealed 1974)); see Signed by the Governor, S.F. CALL, Mar. 13, 1907, at 2.
94. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1915 (Deering 1899) ("The effect of the judgment of any
other tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment, is as
follows: 1. In case of a judgment against a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon
the title to the thing; 2. In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title, and can only be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.").
95. Act of Mar. 11, 1907, ch. 178, § 1 ("A final judgment of any other tribunal of a
foreign country having jurisdiction, according to the laws of such country, to pronounce the
judgment, shall have the same effect as in the country where rendered, and also the same
effect as final judgments rendered in this state." (emphasis added)).
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that the suits would have to be re-litigated in Germany. In this
instance, therefore, a German reciprocity requirement effectively
incentivized interest groups in California to lobby for legislative
change.
As it happened, this story did not have a happy ending for the
policyholders. When they again sought to enforce the California
judgments in Germany after the change in California law, the
German Imperial Court concluded that even the revised law was
insufficient to satisfy German reciprocity requirements.96 This fact
notwithstanding, California did not undo the changes to its foreign
judgments recognition law after the second decision by the Imperial
Court. Indeed, the liberalized law remained on the books until 1967,
when California adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act.97 In this instance, therefore, the German statute
must be viewed as an unqualified success from the point of view of its
drafters: it prompted legislative change which made it easier for
German-judgment creditors to enforce their judgments in California
without exposing German judgment debtors to the sting of having
California judgments enforced against them at home. To the extent
that the conventional wisdom holds that judgments reciprocity will
not lead to changes in foreign state practice, therefore, the case of
California in 1907 provides a compelling counterexample.
2. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984
The discussion of the California policyholders above shows that
reciprocal legislation enacted by a foreign government can, in some
cases, lead interest groups within the United States to successfully
lobby for legislative change. The question arises, however, whether
reciprocal legislation enacted within the United States would prompt
a similar response among interest groups abroad. To answer this
question, it is useful to look to how foreign interest groups responded
96. See Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Enforcement of American Judgments Abroad, 29
YALE L.J. 188, 202-03 (1919). This decision was subjected to severe criticism by a number
of German academics. See id. at 203-04; Wurmnest, supra note 79, at 186-87. In
subsequent years, the German courts "softened the reciprocity requirement's rough edges
by interpreting the notion of reciprocity more broadly, thus silently correcting the
Imperial Court's ruling." Wurmnest, supra note 79, at 187.
97. See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION Acr 1962, 13 pt. II
U.L.A. 39 (2002) (listing California among the states included in the "Table of
Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted"; the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act became effective in California on November 8, 1967).
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to a piece of reciprocal intellectual property legislation enacted by the
United States three decades ago.
In 1984, Congress unanimously approved the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act ("SCPA"). 98 The purpose of the law was to
provide short-term, copyright-like protection to semiconductor chip
designs-known in the trade as "mask works"-thereby providing
U.S. semiconductor manufacturers a weapon to wield against pirates
seeking to reverse engineer their chip designs.9 9 The SCPA's passage
represented the culmination of a multi-year lobbying campaign by the
U.S. semiconductor industry and marked the recognition of a "new"
type of intellectual property not previously accorded protection under
U.S. law."oo
In the months preceding the SCPA's enactment, its drafters were
concerned about the ability of U.S. semiconductor manufacturers to
obtain legal protection for these designs outside of the United States.
The United States was the first nation in the world to grant
intellectual property protection to mask works, and legislators were
concerned that, absent coordination with other jurisdictions, U.S.
semiconductor manufacturers would have little recourse against
pirates operating abroad.' In an attempt to address this concern,
Congress included in the legislation a reciprocity clause stipulating
that the designs of foreign semiconductor manufacturers would be
entitled to protection under the Act if (and only if) their state of
origin agreed to grant similar protections to U.S. manufacturers
under that state's domestic law.10
98. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §H 901-914 (2012)); see Robert W. Kastenmeier &
Michael J. Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm
Ground, 70 MINN. L. REV. 417, 429-30 (1985) (stating that the bill "was unanimously
endorsed"); J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432,2478 (1994).
99. See Reichman, supra note 98, at 2478 & n.234 (noting that these designs were not
entitled to copyright protection); Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law of
Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1578, 1595 (2002); see also 17
U.S.C. § 901(a)(2) (2012) (defining mask works).
100. See Jay A. Erstling, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act and Its Impact on the
International Protection of Chip Designs, 15 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 303, 303-
04 (1989); Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 99, at 1598-1600.
101. See Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note 98, at 466 ("Since the United States
was the first country to protect clearly mask works in specific implementing legislation,
Congress had no recourse but to create a unilateral scheme that hopefully will spawn a
movement towards first bilateralism and then multilateralism.").
102. 17 U.S.C. §§ 902(a), 914(a)(1)-(3); see also H.R. REP. No. 98-781, at 8 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5750, 5757 ("[The SCPA] affords full reciprocity to foreign
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The drafters of the reciprocity provision were very clear about
their intent to use the clause to encourage foreign states to change
their laws. As one member of the relevant House subcommittee
stated, "We ... decided to conduct an experiment by providing
[reciprocity] provisions intended to encourage the rapid development
of a new worldwide regime for the protection of semiconductor
chips."os By 1989, the European Community ("E.C.") and six other
nations had adopted legislation granting protection to mask works in
direct response to the SCPA.'" Another eleven nations had such
legislation under consideration."o' In the words of one observer, "The
allure of reciprocity under the SCPA ... motivated a host of nations,
including Japan, the Member States of the European Communities
. . . , Sweden, Finland, Canada, Australia, and Switzerland, to adopt
or consider adopting chip protection legislation."'0 6 The SCPA is thus
a case in which reciprocal legislation enacted by the United States
successfully brought about a change in the law and practice of a
number of foreign states.
It is also noteworthy that a number of these states chose to enact
responsive legislation only after sustained lobbying from domestic
interest groups. In Japan, for example, local semiconductor
manufacturers actively lobbied the government to enact such
legislation and contributed $5 million in funds to establish the agency
tasked with administering the new registration regime for mask
owners of mask works and allows them to secure protection under this Act if their country
allows such protection to U.S. owners of mask works."); id. at 18 (describing the subject
matter protected by the SCPA).
103. 133 CONG. REC. 8068 (1987) (statement of Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier).
104. Erstling, supra note 100, at 306. Certain elements of these various national laws
were ultimately incorporated into the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of
Integrated Circuits in 1989. See Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated
Circuits, opened for signature May 26, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1484. The text of this treaty was, in
turn, incorporated into Article 35 of the TRIPS Agreement, which became effective in
1995. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 35,
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197 ("Members agree to provide protection to the layout-designs
(topographies) of integrated circuits (referred to in this Agreement as 'layout-designs') in
accordance with Articles 2 through 7 (other than paragraph 3 of Article 6), Article 12 and
paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated
Circuits...."). All of this legislating notwithstanding, the protections afforded by the
SCPA are rarely invoked by U.S. semiconductor manufacturers today. See Miriam Bitton,
A New Outlook on the Economic Dimension of the Database Protection Debate, 47 IDEA
93, 124 (2006) ("In practice, [the SCPA] has been utilized very infrequently, and the
semiconductor chip industry has relied almost exclusively on patent protection.").
105. See Erstling, supra note 100, at 321-22.
106. Id. at 306.
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works.10 In Canada, no fewer than four trade groups banded together
to urge the government to enact comparable legislation. 0 In Finland,
legislation on this topic was initially proposed by a trade association-
the Confederation of Finnish Industries-rather than by legislators."o
The parties responsible for pushing legislative change in jurisdictions
outside the United States, in short, were not infrequently private
companies with an economic stake in the outcome.110
3. European Community Database Directive of 1996
Each of the cases discussed above highlighted an instance in
which interest groups lobbied successfully to change a law in response
to reciprocal legislation. There is no guarantee, however, that interest
groups will always play a positive role in sponsoring such change.
History suggests that such groups can also work to prevent a
legislature from enacting such responsive legislation, as illustrated by
the case of the European Community Database Directive.
On March 11, 1996, the E.C. officially adopted its Directive on
the Legal Protection of Databases."' The Directive's primary goal
was to grant sui generis intellectual property protection to databases
and, in so doing, to make the E.C. a more attractive market for
database designers.112 In an effort to incentivize foreign states to grant
107. See id. at 324; Letter from Akio Morita to Senator Charles Mathias, Jr. and
Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier (July 18, 1984) ("[The Electronic Industries
Association of Japan] recognizes the need for, and importance of, protection in Japan for
the intellectual property embodied in semiconductor chips. Accordingly, we will ask the
Government of Japan to provide such protection, as expeditiously as possible, through a
new legislative framework.").
108. See Erstling, supra note 100, at 330 & n.118 (noting that these groups included the
Canadian Manufacturers' Association, the Electrical and Electronics Manufacturers
Association of Canada, the Canadian Business Equipment Manufacturers Association,
and the Canadian Advanced Technology Association).
109. Id. at 338.
110. It is of course possible that responsive legislation would have been enacted in
these other jurisdictions even in the absence of lobbying pressure; given the complexities
in the legislative process in any one country-let alone across many foreign jurisdictions-
it is impossible to attribute a legislative outcome to any one single factor. The fact that
lobbying pressure by private groups was clearly brought to bear on foreign governments in
this instance, however, suggests that the success or failure of reciprocal legislation enacted
by the United States will in some cases be affected by the reaction of interest groups in
those states.
111. Directive 96/9, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996
on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77).
112. See Philip J. Cardinale, Comment, Sui Generis Database Protection: Second
Thoughts in the European Union and What It Means for the United States, 6 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 157, 157 (2007).
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similar protections to European database designers, the drafters of
the Directive included a reciprocity clause which conditioned the
protection of databases from non-member countries on the reciprocal
grant of protection.113 Absent such a grant of reciprocal protection, a
non-member database producer would have no legal recourse in the
E.C. if its databases were reproduced or otherwise used by nationals
of E.C. member states.
Several commentators have noted the parallels between the
E.C.'s efforts to encourage foreign states to grant protection to
database designers and U.S. efforts to do the same with respect to
semiconductor manufacturers.'14 Indeed, at least one scholar has
argued that the E.C. modeled its Directive explicitly after the
approach pioneered by the United States with the SCPA."' The early
signs suggested that the Directive's reciprocity clause would succeed
in bringing about a change in U.S. law. Within months of the
Directive's adoption, legislation was introduced into Congress
offering protections to database makers comparable to those set forth
in the Directive.116 The sense of urgency here was attributable to
several factors, but the reciprocity clause played a role. As one
commentator has argued, "the E.U.'s reciprocity clause provided the
immediate catalyst [for the U.S. legislation], due to the expectation
that the Directive would put U.S. database producers at a competitive
disadvantage. "117
The proposed U.S. legislation was strongly supported by a
number of interest groups in the United States. These groups
included the Information Industry Association-the "principal trade
association for the software and digital content industry"'-and the
113. See id. at 158; see also 142 CONG. REC. 12484 (1996) (statement of Rep. Carlos J.
Moorhead) (explaining that the "Directive could place U.S. firms at an enormous
competitive disadvantage throughout the entire European market").
114. See, e.g., Mark Powell, The European Union's Database Directive: An
International Antidote to the Side Effects of Feist?, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1215, 1216 n.9
(1997) ("There are clear parallels between the EU's vanguard approach to the legal
protection of databases and the creation by U.S. Congress of a sui generis form of
protection for semiconductor mask works in the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
1984....").
115. See Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property and International Mergers and
Acquisitions, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1295 (1998).
116. See Cardinale, supra note 112, at 158.
117. Id. at 162.
118. About SIIA, SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUSTRY ASS'N (2014), http://www.siia.net
/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=159&Itemid=6; see Collections of
Information Antipiracy Act; Vessel Hull Design Protection Act; Trade Dress Protection Act;
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American Medical Association."9 These groups argued that if the
United States did not pass responsive legislation, their databases
would be pirated with impunity by European companies. 120 With the
support of these groups, the legislation easily cleared the U.S. House
of Representatives in 1998.121 The bill failed, however, to advance in
the Senate.122 In subsequent years, similar bills were introduced, but
these, too, failed to pass.123 As of the time of this writing, the
reciprocity clause attached to the Directive has not led to any
meaningful change in U.S. law.
What accounts for this failure? Opposition from domestic
interest groups, among other factors, played an important role.124 The
Online Banking Association, the Information Technology
Association of America, and the Association of Directory Publishers
all opposed the legislation.125 These groups actively lobbied against
the proposed legislation on the grounds that it would "increase[] ...
transaction costs for assembling information which would thereby
stifle competition."126 Scientists, researchers, and academics, all of
whom regularly rely on databases compiled by other parties to
conduct their research, also opposed the bill.127 Collectively, these
groups managed to defeat the legislation. This defeat is particularly
noteworthy because other states-including Mexico and Brazil-did,
in fact, enact database protection legislation following the enactment
of the Database Directive. 28
and Internet Domain Name Trademark Protection: Hearings on H.R. 2652, H.R. 2696 and
H.R. 3163 Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 144 (1999) [herinafter Hearings on H.R. 2652, H.R. 2696 and H.R.
3163] (statement of Robert E. Aber, on behalf of the Information Industry Association,
now named the Software & Information Industry Association).
119. See Cardinale, supra note 112, at 162-63.
120. See id. at 163; Hearings on H.R. 2652, H.R. 2696 and H.R. 3163, supra note 118, at
145 (statement of Robert E. Aber, on behalf of the Information Industry Association, now
named the Software & Information Industry Association).
121. See Cardinale, supra note 112, at 164.
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. See Stephen M. Maurer, P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Harlan J. Onsrud, Europe's
Database Experiment, 294 SCI. 789, 789 (2001).
125. See Cardinale, supra note 112, at 164.
126. Id. at 164.
127. See id. at 158; see also J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property
Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 73 (1997) (noting that the United States has
historically "favored free and open access to scientific data").
128. Collections of Information Antipiracy Act: Hearing on H.R. 354 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
170 (2000) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 354] (statement of Dan Duncan, Vice President,
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B. Insights and Conclusion
The foregoing case studies suggest that the strong version of the
conventional wisdom-that reciprocity requirements are always
ineffective-is indefensible. There are several historical examples in
which these requirements did, in fact, successfully bring about some
change in foreign law. These examples do not, however, serve to
disprove the weak version of the conventional wisdom-that
reciprocity requirements are rarely effective. It may well be that the
vast majority of reciprocity requirements do not work and that the
California legislation of 1907, the SCPA, and the Database Directive
are the exceptions to the rule.
Even if legislative regimes premised on reciprocity are only
rarely effective, the fact that they can be successful means that each
proposed regime must be considered on its own merits to determine
its likely effect. In conducting such an inquiry, one would ideally wish
to draw upon an analytical framework that identifies those factors
that are most relevant to the success of any piece of reciprocal
legislation. The common elements exhibited by the foregoing case
studies, happily, offer a basis for constructing such a framework.
First, and most importantly, foreign interest groups matter.
Particularly with respect to legislation where the primary purpose is
to determine legal rights between and among private parties (such as
with the enforcement of judgments), the willingness of a foreign
legislature to take up and pass such a law in response to a reciprocity
requirement will, in many cases, depend upon the willingness of
foreign interest groups to lobby in support of that law. In order to
gauge the likelihood that a particular reciprocity requirement will
prompt legislative change in a particular state, one would be well-
advised to consider first how interest groups in that state-supporters
and opponents alike-are likely to react to the incentives provided by
that requirement. 29
Government Affairs, Software & Information Industry Association) ("Mexico has had a
database protection law in place since 1997, also with reciprocity provisions. Brazil has
adopted a similar law.").
129. There are, to be sure, limits on the use of interest-group analysis. In situations
where the response to a particular piece of reciprocal legislation must originate in a
governmental actor that is not elected-such as a court-then interest groups will likely
play a much smaller role in shaping the response. This point is illustrated by the well-
known Munzer case in France. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial
matters] le civ., Jan. 7, 1964, Bull. civ. I, No. 15. Throughout the nineteenth and the early
twentieth century, France reserved the right to review the merits of decisions rendered by
foreign courts before deciding whether to enforce those decisions in France, a doctrine
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Second, reciprocal legislation will not have a universal effect on
all foreign states. While a number of commercially important states
enacted legislation designed to protect semiconductor designs in the
years after the United States adopted the SCPA, a number of other
similarly important states did not.'30 Similarly, while Brazil and
Mexico enacted database protection legislation in the years after the
E.C. adopted the Database Directive, the United States did not.131 To
suggest that all states are likely to respond to a reciprocity provision
in the same way, therefore, is to fail to account for the complexity of
international politics and the vagaries of the domestic legislative
process.
Third, interest groups are most likely to lobby for legislative
change in cases in which the returns to such lobbying are direct and
known as revision au fond. Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 238, 243. In the 1940s and 1950s,
however, this rule came under sustained attack from academic commentators in France.
See id. at 243. In 1964, the Cour de cassation formally abandoned the doctrine of rivision
au fond in the Munzer case. See Cass. le civ., Jan. 7, 1964, Bull. civ. I, No. 15; James C.
Regan, Comment, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in France Under the Nouveau
Code de Proc6dure Civile, 4 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 149, 162 (1981). A number of
contemporary commentators noted that the decision in Munzer would make it possible for
French-judgment creditors to enforce French judgments in Germany because French
judgments policy was now compliant with the longstanding German reciprocity
requirement. See Kurt H. Nadelmann, French Courts Recognize Foreign Money-
Judgments: One Down and More To Go, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 72, 78 (1964); Arthur Taylor
von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments-General Theory and
the Role of Jurisdictional Requirements, in 167 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9,49 (1981); cf Georges
Holleaux, Case Comment, Cass. le civ., Jan. 8, 1963, 52 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVi 109, 113 (1963) (noting the difficulty, prior to Munzer, of
enforcing a French judgment in Germany). While it is unclear whether a desire to
facilitate the enforcement of French judgments in Germany was the court's intention-or
whether it was merely an incidental effect of the decision-a number of scholars have
cited the Munzer case as another instance in which a piece of reciprocal legislation
brought about a change in the practice of a foreign state. See, e.g., Nadelmann, supra, at
78; von Mehren, supra, at 49 & n.80. If this characterization is accepted as accurate, then it
illustrates the limits of looking to interest-group influence to determine the likely impact
of reciprocal legislation. Unlike the French parliament, the judges on the Cour de
cassation are not elected and, consequently, are unlikely to be reliant on interest groups
for electoral support. See MARY L. VOLCANSEK, MARIA ELISABETIA DE FRANCISCIS &
JACQUELINE LUCIENNE LAFON, JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT: A CROSS-NATIONAL
COMPARISON 37 (1996). In cases in which the governmental actor with the authority to
respond to a piece of reciprocal legislation is insulated from political pressure, in short,
one must look to other factors beyond interest-group politics to evaluate that jurisdiction's
likely response.
130. See Erstling, supra note 100, at 306 (noting certain foreign states that have
adopted or are considering the adoption of "chip protection legislation").
131. See Hearing on H.R. 354, supra note 128, at 170.
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immediate. The policyholders in California stood to gain the ability to
enforce sizable (and already rendered) judgments in Germany. The
semiconductor manufacturers stood to gain intellectual property
protection for a product they had already designed. This is not to
suggest that successful lobbying cannot occur when the benefits are
more temporally remote. 32 It is merely to note that the incentives for
individuals to organize and lobby for change are much stronger when
the rewards are more immediate.
With these insights in mind, the remainder of this Article
considers whether the enactment of reciprocal judgments legislation
by the United States along the lines suggested by the ALI would, in
fact, be likely to prompt foreign states that currently refuse to enforce
U.S. judgments to reconsider their respective positions.
IV. A THEORY OF JUDGMENTS RECIPROCITY
The question of whether the United States should adopt a policy
of judgments reciprocity at the national level is, at its heart, a
question of whether the policy is likely to lead certain foreign states
to reverse their position of refusing to enforce U.S. judgments.
Whether this reversal will occur depends, in significant part, upon
how particular interest groups in these nations react to the new policy
of judgments reciprocity. This Part identifies the relevant interest
groups and weighs how they are likely to react as a theoretical matter.
Part V then uses this analysis to evaluate the likely impact of such a
policy in practice.
A. Foreign-Judgment Creditors
If the United States were to adopt a policy of judgments
reciprocity, its impact would be felt most keenly by actual and
132. One example in which reciprocal legislation was successfully used by interest
groups to achieve ends that were temporally remote involves a movement to reform state
inheritance laws in the United States during the early twentieth century. See Starr, supra
note 22, at 395-98 (discussing the successful movement to persuade twenty-five state
legislatures in the United States to enact reciprocal legislation relating to inheritance
taxation and suggesting that its success was attributable in part to interest-group
lobbying); see also Current Legislation, Legislative Efforts in New York to Avoid
Multiplicity in Inheritance Taxation, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 806, 809 (1928) ("Reciprocity of
this sort ... has since been adopted by a large number of states, with general
satisfaction."); Fin. Dep't, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., Consider Interstate Death
Tax Proposal, PUB. DOLLAR, Jan. 1929, at 1 ("Bills designed to effectuate the [reciprocity]
proposal ... have been sponsored and endorsed by commercial organizations in virtually
all of the affected states.").
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potential foreign-judgment creditors who reside in nations that
currently refuse to enforce U.S. judgments.' These individuals
would, as a direct consequence of the reciprocity requirement, no
longer be able to enforce their judgments in the United States and
would consequently suffer some economic loss.'34 The key question is
how these judgment creditors would respond to this development. If
they perceive their new inability to enforce judgments in the United
States as a serious threat to their economic interests, they may well
band together to lobby for their home state to reverse its policy of
refusing to enforce U.S. judgments. If they perceive this development
as only a minor inconvenience, however, then they will not lobby for
change and the status quo will be maintained.
Whether these individuals perceive a reciprocity requirement as
a serious threat to their economic interests will, in turn, depend upon
the size of the judgments at issue and the frequency with which
enforcement actions occur. If foreign-judgment creditors routinely
seek to enforce sizable judgments rendered by their home state's
courts in the United States, then they are more likely to pool their
resources to lobby for change. If these same individuals enforce
judgments rendered by their home state's courts in the United States
only rarely, or if the judgments that they seek to enforce are for
relatively small amounts, then they are less likely to allocate time and
resources to lobbying. The ability of reciprocal legislation to bring
about changes to the laws of foreign states, in short, will depend in
significant part upon the economic impact that such legislation is
likely to have on these judgment creditors.
133. The analysis in this Part assumes that foreign-judgment creditors are domiciliaries
of the foreign state that rendered the original judgment. It assumes, in other words, that
the typical configuration will involve a plaintiff from State A seeking to enforce a
judgment rendered by a court in State A against a defendant in the United States. This
assumption will not hold in all cases. Consider, for example, a scenario whereby a plaintiff
from State A brings suit against a U.S. defendant in the courts of State B. If the plaintiff
from State A wins the suit, he may seek to enforce the resulting judgment rendered by the
State B court in the United States even though the plaintiff himself is not a citizen of State
B. While this particular scenario sometimes arises, it is more common to see a judgment
creditor seeking to enforce a judgment rendered by a court of the judgment creditor's
home state. Accordingly, this is treated as the typical scenario.
134. The nature of the loss associated with a lack of ability to enforce a foreign
judgment will vary from case to case. In some cases, it will be the value of the original
(unenforced) judgment. In other cases, the loss may be the cost of re-litigating the dispute
in the United States. If, for example, a foreign-judgment creditor was unable to enforce a
$50 million judgment against a U.S. debtor but successfully re-litigates the case in the
United States at a cost of $2.5 million in attorneys' fees, then the judgment creditor's loss
is $2.5 million, not $50 million.
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Even if one assumes, however, that individuals in a particular
state routinely enforce sizable judgments against U.S. defendants in
the United States, there remains the question of whether these
individuals will in fact come together to lobby for change. If very few
of these litigants ever seek to enforce a judgment in the United States
more than once, for example, then they may decide not to pool their
resources because they (rationally) conclude that their individual
costs of organizing are likely to exceed the individual benefits of
changing the law." In these cases, it is possible that an existing
organization such as a trade association (or perhaps the local
equivalent of the chamber of commerce) will step in to advance the
general interests of the business community.136 If this particular cause
enjoys only diffuse and general support across its membership,
however, it is possible that the organization will decide to allocate its
time and resources to other projects that its members support more
intensely.'37
It is, of course, always possible that a single judgment creditor
(or group of creditors) that has obtained (or is in a position to obtain)
a judgment of exceptional size will conclude that it is in its economic
interest to lobby for a change in the law even if the odds of repeat
play are low. 1 8 This is arguably what happened in California in
1907.1'9 When the size of a judgment is sufficiently large, then the
lobbying costs may be viewed as worthwhile even if the plaintiff will
never again seek to enforce another judgment in the United States.
Judgments of exceptional size are, however, fairly rare." In addition,
a foreign legislature may be wary of amending its laws relating to the
135. See DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW
AND ECONOMICS 489 (1992) ("Rational maximizers decide to form an interest group just
as they make any other decision, by comparing the costs with the benefits.").
136. See id. at 490 ("Groups already formed to achieve another joint purpose ... have
a distinct cost advantage when it comes to lobbying."); see also MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 47
(1965) ("In certain cases a group will already be organized for some other purpose, and
then these costs of organization are already being met.").
137. See BARNES & STOUT, supra note 135, at 489 ("[T]he more intense the interest of
individual group members, the more likely a group will be formed.").
138. See Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non
Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1447-
48 (2011) (discussing an $18 billion judgment against Chevron rendered by a court in
Ecuador); Wurmnest, supra note 79, at 186 (discussing efforts by California-judgment
creditors seeking to enforce U.S. judgments against German insurance companies after
the San Francisco Earthquake of 1906).
139. See supra Part III.A.1.
140. See infra Table 1.
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enforcement of judgments-which are laws of general application-
solely for the purpose of benefiting a single judgment creditor.
It is also possible that foreign-judgment creditors would respond
to a reciprocity requirement not by lobbying for change but rather by
developing workarounds. They may, for example, choose to write
arbitration clauses into contracts that they negotiate with their
American partners; foreign arbitral awards are enforceable in the
United States under the New York Convention, a legal regime that is
separate and distinct from the one relating to the enforcement of
foreign judgments.14 1 Alternatively, they could choose to bring suit in
the United States in the first instance, thereby avoiding the need to
seek enforcement of any foreign judgment. There are, to be sure,
potential problems associated with each of these alternatives.
Arbitration is increasingly costly and is rarely (if ever) available in
tort suits. 142 Further, the costs of litigating in the United States may
include language difficulties, a lack of familiarity with the U.S. legal
system, and the inconvenience of transporting witnesses to the United
States to testify. Nevertheless, the costs of arbitrating disputes or
litigating them in the United States may be viewed as sufficiently
manageable so that foreign-judgment creditors see little upside in
investing time and resources into lobbying to change their home
state's laws relating to the enforcement of judgments.
In summary, actual and potential foreign-judgment creditors are
the engine that will drive the process of legal reform in response to a
141. See U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38; see also 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2012) (legislation implementing the Convention in the United States).
Since the New York Convention has been so widely ratified-it is currently in force in
more than 144 states, including the United States-it is easier to enforce a foreign arbitral
award than to enforce a foreign judgment in many states. See Status: Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), UNCITRAL
(2014), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitrallen/uncitral-texts/arbitration/NYConvention
status.html (providing updates on the status of Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards). The viability of arbitration as an alternative to
litigation, in other words, has arguably given private parties little incentive to lobby
aggressively for changes to the laws relating to the enforcement of foreign judgments.
142. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The "New Litigation," 2010 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 8 (noting the increased cost of arbitration relative to litigation); Louise Ellen
Teitz, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating Party Autonomy and Providing
an Alternative to Arbitration, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 543, 544 (2005) (observing that the
Hague Choice of Court Convention, which makes it easier to resolve international
disputes in national courts, "was designed to help the middle class litigant, not just the
large multinational corporations which tend to resolve transnational disputes through
arbitration" (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
4
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policy of judgments reciprocity. As the individuals in the foreign state
who will feel the sting of a reciprocity requirement most keenly, they
are the ones who will be most motivated to lobby for change. If
judgment creditors from a particular state are unwilling, unable, or
uninterested in lobbying their legislature for any reason, then any
U.S. reciprocity provision relating to the enforcement of judgments is
unlikely to have its desired effect in that state.
B. Other Interest Groups
The incentives of foreign-judgment creditors, while important,
are not the whole story. In order to fully account for the interest-
group dynamics in a foreign state, it is also necessary to consider the
incentives of other interest groups.
One such group consists of actual and potential judgment
debtors. Actual judgment debtors are individuals in the foreign state
who have already lost lawsuits in the United States. Potential
judgment debtors are individuals in the foreign state who fear that
they may someday lose a lawsuit in the United States.'43 Since these
debtors currently reside in a state that refuses to enforce U.S.
judgments, they have the ability to force a past or future U.S.-
judgment creditor to settle a successful suit brought against them in
the United States at a discount-or to force the creditor to re-litigate
the dispute in the courts of the debtors' home state-so long as they
lack sufficient U.S. assets to satisfy the judgment. If the debtors'
home state were to amend its laws to make it easier for creditors to
enforce U.S. judgments, however, then the judgment debtors would
lose these advantages.1" These individuals are therefore likely to
oppose any effort to change the laws of the foreign state, provided
143. In evaluating the incentives of this group, the views of potential judgment debtors
are likely to play as important a role as those of actual judgment debtors. See
Baumgartner, supra note 17, at 980 ("[I1n this context, perception is more important than
reality.").
144. See WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 64, at 157, 160 (discussing reasons why
individuals might prefer that their state not recognize foreign judgments). There is
evidence that foreign interest groups have in the past sought to make it more difficult for
U.S.-judgment creditors to enforce U.S. judgments in their home states. See Baumgartner,
supra note 17, at 990 (arguing that "there have been more general efforts by [foreign]
individuals and groups to change recognition doctrine so as to render the recognition and
enforcement of U.S. judgments more difficult").
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that the perceived benefits of lobbying against the change are great
145
enough to overcome the costs of organizing.
Legal academics and judges may also play a role in shaping a
particular foreign state's potential response to a reciprocity
requirement. A number of studies have shown that academics gain
status within the legal profession by becoming involved in legal
reform.146 In situations in which the issue in question is somewhat
technical, is of only intermittent concern to most businesses, and is
primarily the province of lawyers-all of which is arguably true in the
judgments context-the possibility arises that foreign legal academics
may play a role in determining their state's response. It is also
possible that the foreign judges will choose to weigh in with their
views. 147 It is, however, difficult to gauge in the abstract how each of
these groups would respond to the imposition of a reciprocity
requirement. On the one hand, one could imagine a cadre of
reformist legal academics and judges coming together to support a
proposal to liberalize the current laws relating to the enforcement of
145. Further, if actual and potential judgment debtors view the U.S. legal system as
generating fair and reasonable outcomes, then they are unlikely to oppose the proposed
change. If they view the system as a lottery that routinely generates windfalls for
undeserving plaintiffs, then they are likely to oppose these changes. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that the perception of the U.S. civil justice system in a number of European states
is not particularly positive, but more research is necessary to determine whether these
views would coalesce into a lobbying effort. See, e.g., Samuel P. Baumgartner, How Well
Do U.S. Judgments Fare in Europe?, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 173, 213 (2008)
(observing that the prevalent view in Germany has long been "of a U.S. litigation system
in which strike suits are rampant and in which defending such suits is an unreasonably
expensive proposition").
146. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 610 (1995) ("[Legal reformers] differ from interest
group members in two relevant ways. First, a reformer derives utility from a [private
legislature]'s passage of a reform proposal independently of whether the proposal
ultimately becomes law. The reformer is commonly a law professor who can write about
and teach [private legislature] proposals because the proposals are plausible candidates for
becoming law. Moreover, status in academia attaches to one who causes a [private
legislature] to adopt a proposal. In contrast, an interest group member derives utility from
[private legislature] adoption of a proposal only when adoption increases the likelihood or
reduces the costs of securing ultimate, stable legislative enactment."); see also Robert K.
Rasmussen, The Uneasy Case Against the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 LA. L. REV.
1097, 1122 (2002) (noting that academics may choose to become involved in legal reform
out of a desire for cultivating "prestige with the practicing bar").
147. Cf Christopher E. Smith, Judicial Lobbying and Court Reform: U.S. Magistrate
Judges and the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 14 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 163, 173
(1992) (discussing federal judicial lobbying in the United States).
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judgments.14 On the other hand, one could just as easily imagine
these groups banding together to oppose any changes to the law
because of their discomfort with certain elements of U.S. legal
practice.149 The precise reaction among these groups is likely to vary
depending on the foreign state in question.
Still another group that may have an interest in the outcome of
any lobbying effort is the local plaintiffs' bar. If such a group exists
within a particular foreign state, then it will have a strong incentive to
preserve the ability of judgment creditors to enforce their home
state's judgments in the United States. All things being equal, these
attorneys would prefer to be able to litigate at home and enforce
abroad because, in most cases, they will be licensed to practice law
only in their home jurisdiction. If a client must re-litigate a dispute in
the United States as a result of a reciprocity requirement, these
attorneys will not be able to earn fees from the second representation.
Indeed, depending on the local rules, these attorneys may find that
they will not be paid for their work in the first representation until the
second is resolved. From the perspective of the plaintiffs' bar,
therefore, there is good reason to prefer a legal rule that facilitates
the enforcement of local judgments in the United States. In some
cases, such as those involving tort victims, the plaintiffs' bar may
actually be better positioned to lobby for change than the clients
(who are formally the judgment creditors) because of existing
organizational advantages and because they are more likely to be
repeat players. The incentives of this group will, however, largely
track those of the foreign-judgment creditors. If these creditors rarely
seek to enforce judgments in the United States, then their attorneys
will see little need to lobby the legislature in order to preserve their
clients' ability to do so.
C. National Institutions
In gauging how likely it is that any one of these interest groups
will be successful in its lobbying efforts, it is also important to
consider the national institutional structures in which these efforts
will take place.1s0 In congressional systems such as the United States,
148. Cf supra note 129 (noting that changing views among French academics helped
pave the way to a change in French enforcement practice during the 1960s).
149. See Baumgartner, supra note 18, at 1338-44 (discussing the changing views of
German legal academics regarding the desirability of enforcing U.S. judgments).
150. In conducting this inquiry, it would be a mistake to assume that models of interest-
group politics developed by U.S. legal scholars in the specific context of U.S. institutions
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for example, interest groups may play a more active role in shaping
legislation because congressional leaders assemble legislative voting
coalitions one policy issue at a time.1s' In parliamentary systems such
as those used in much of Europe, by contrast, interest groups may
play a reduced role because the vote of confidence procedure
promotes discipline within the governing coalition and reduces the
need for legislators to obtain information from lobbyists.152
Still other differences may stem from the idiosyncratic
characteristics of specific national political structures. In Italy, for
example, scholars have long observed that interest groups play a
more influential role at certain ministries (labor, industry, commerce)
than at others (war, interior, foreign affairs)."' And, at least
historically, national interest groups are generally viewed by scholars
as exercising less influence over legislatures in Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain than over legislatures in Austria, Finland, and the
Netherlands.'54 In-depth studies of the national parliaments of France
and Germany have also shown that interest groups exercise varying
degrees of power in each of these two bodies.' These institutional
factors will also play a role in determining the ultimate result of any
lobbying effort assuming, again, that the engine driving such an
effort-foreign-judgment creditors-is committed to the project.
may be applied directly to evaluate how interest groups operate in other national political
systems; one French legal scholar has described "the vanity and the dangers of such a
position." Joseph LaPalombara, The Utility and Limitations of Interest Group Theory in
Non-American Field Situations, 22 J. POL. 29, 29 (1960) (quoting Jean Meynaud, I gruppi
d'interesse in Francia, 4 STUDI POLITICI, July-Sept. 1957, at 433-34).
151. See Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, Lobbying Legislatures, 110 J. POL.
ECON. 919, 942 (2002).
152. See id. at 942-43.
153. See LaPalombara, supra note 150, at 43-44.
154. See Ulrike Liebert, Parliamentary Lobby Regimes, in PARLIAMENTS AND
MAJORITY RULE IN WESTERN EUROPE 407, 430-33 (Herbert Dbring ed., 1995)
(discussing the dynamics of lobbying the executive and how these differ from those of
lobbying the legislature).
155. See JOHN D. HUBER, RATIONALIZING PARLIAMENT: LEGISLATIVE
INSTITUTIONS AND PARTY POLITICS IN FRANCE 94-95 (1996) (discussing the role of
interest groups in French parliament); KLAUS VON BEYME, THE LEGISLATOR: GERMAN
PARLIAMENT AS A CENTRE OF POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING 48-62 (1998) (discussing
the role of interest groups in German parliament). See generally INTEREST GROUPS ON
FOUR CONTINENTS (Henry W. Ehrmann ed., 1958) (discussing the varying roles of
interest groups in a number of nations).
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V. RETHINKING JUDGMENTS RECIPROCITY
Having developed an analytical framework for evaluating the
impact of reciprocal legislation in the judgments context as a
theoretical matter, this Part considers whether a U.S. policy of
judgments reciprocity would, in fact, prompt the foreign states that
currently refuse to enforce U.S. judgments to change their position.
To this end, it first discusses the differences between the various rules
of reciprocity that the United States could adopt. It next identifies the
states whose judgments would be affected by one such rule-the one
proposed by the American Law Institute in 2006-and considers how
actual and potential judgment creditors in those states would be
affected by such a policy.5 6 This Part ultimately concludes that the
rule of reciprocity proposed by the ALI is highly unlikely to motivate
judgment creditors in the states that currently refuse to enforce U.S.
judgments to lobby for change and that, as a consequence, U.S.
nationals are unlikely to benefit from the adoption of this rule at the
federal level.
A. The Relevant Rule of Reciprocity
While all reciprocal legislation seeks to achieve the same basic
goal, not all reciprocity provisions are created equal. A particular
statute may, for example, adopt a test of strict reciprocity that allows
for very few exceptions. Alternatively, a statute may impose a general
obligation of reciprocity but carve out enough exceptions to this rule
that it is somewhat lenient in practice. There are at least three ways in
which one rule of reciprocity may differ materially from another: (1)
its scope of general application, (2) the assignment of the burden of
proof, and (3) carve-outs to its scope of application.
First, the scope of a particular reciprocity provision may vary
depending on the precise language chosen by its drafters. In
Massachusetts, for example, the reciprocity provision literally applies
to any judgment rendered by any court in the foreign state.' A
refusal on the part of a foreign state to respect a judgment of divorce
entered by a Massachusetts court, therefore, could potentially provide
156. The analysis in this Part also assumes that there is no "bundling" of related
issues-such as trade or military aid-that could prompt interest groups otherwise
uninterested in the enforcement of foreign judgments to support a change in the law on
this topic. The possibility of bundling is discussed in the Conclusion.
157. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 235, § 23A (LexisNexis 2009) ("A foreign judgment shall
not be recognized if ... judgments of this state are not recognized in the courts of the
foreign state.").
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grounds for a Massachusetts court to refuse to recognize a money
judgment rendered by that same state. The drafters of the ALI's
statute, by contrast, stipulate that reciprocity shall be denied only in
cases where a foreign court would not enforce comparable judgments
rendered by courts in the United States."ss Under this approach, a
refusal on the part of a foreign court to recognize a judgment of
divorce entered by a U.S. state would not be grounds for a U.S. court
to refuse to recognize a money judgment rendered by the foreign
court.
Second, the impact of a particular reciprocity provision will in
many cases depend on which party is assigned the burden of proof. In
Georgia, for example, the foreign-judgment creditor bears the burden
of proving that the rendering state would enforce a U.S. judgment.15 9
Under the rule proposed by the ALI, by contrast, the judgment
debtor in the United States bears the burden of proving that the
rendering state would not enforce a U.S. judgment." In close cases,
where the precise nature of foreign practice is unclear, there is a
much greater likelihood that a foreign judgment will be enforced if
the burden of proving a lack of reciprocity is placed on the U.S.-
judgment debtor.
Third, and finally, a reciprocity provision may expressly carve
out certain types of judgments from its ambit. The rule proposed by
the ALI, for example, states that a refusal on the part of a foreign
court to enforce U.S. judgments for "punitive, exemplary, or multiple
damages shall not be regarded as denial of reciprocal enforcement of
judgments ... if the courts of the state of origin would enforce the
compensatory portions of such judgments."'61 The effect of this
particular carve-out is to limit the impact of the reciprocity provision;
many foreign countries refuse to enforce those portions of U.S.
judgments that award punitive or multiple damages. 62 In effect, this
158. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, § 7(a) ("A foreign judgment shall not be recognized
or enforced in a court in the United States if the court finds that comparable judgments of
courts in the United States would not be recognized or enforced in the courts of the state
of origin.").
159. See Shehadeh v. Alexander, 727 S.E.2d 227, 229 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
160. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, § 7(b).
161. Id. § 7(d).
162. See, e.g., Baumgartner, supra note 17, at 993-96 (discussing concern among
foreign judges about U.S. punitive damages awards); Comm. on Foreign & Comparative
Law, supra note 32, 391-93 (same); Discussion of International Jurisdiction and Judgments,
supra note 17, at 457 (remarks of Prof. Catherine Kessedjian) ("[E]verybody fears to be
obliged to enforce what they consider to be excessive judgments coming out of U.S.
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provision directs U.S. courts to find that reciprocity exists even in
cases where the foreign state in question refuses to enforce certain
types of U.S. money judgments.
The precise character of the chosen rule of reciprocity-its scope
of application, its assignment of the burden of proof, and its various
carve-outs-will not alter the nature of the basic inquiry outlined in
Part IV. It will, however, serve to limit (or to expand) the number of
nations in which it is necessary to consider the likely response of
various interest groups. If a particular nation refuses to enforce U.S.
punitive judgment awards but enforces other U.S. money judgments,
for example, judgment creditors from that nation will not be affected
by the rule of reciprocity proposed by the ALI because of the carve-
out provision. The precise rule chosen will thus "pre-screen" for
states that are likely to be affected by that rule. If judgments from a
particular state would not be affected, then the rule change is unlikely
to have any impact upon interest groups in those states. In these
situations, there is no need to inquire as to how these interest groups
from such states will react.
The analysis below uses the ALI rule as its baseline for several
reasons. First, this rule has received an enormous amount of scholarly
attention since it was first proposed in 2006.163 Second, this rule won
the endorsement of a significant number of prominent U.S. academics
who are familiar with the debates surrounding the use of reciprocity
in the judgments context." Third, and finally, if Congress should
choose to take up legislation on the topic of foreign judgments, the
ALI rule may well serve as the starting point for any legislative
proposal. With this rule in mind, the Article next considers how it
would impact the ability of judgment creditors to enforce certain
foreign judgments in the United States.
courts."); Adam Liptak, Foreign Courts Wary of U.S. Punitive Damages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 2008, at Al ("The U.S. practice of permitting a lay jury to exercise largely
discretionary judgment with limited constraints in awarding punitive damages is regarded
almost universally outside the U.S. with a high degree of disfavor." (quoting Gary Born)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
163. See supra note 9 (collecting sources).
164. See Discussion of Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Analysis
and Proposed Federal Statute, supra note 8, at 159 (remarks of Michael Traynor, President,
Am. Law Inst.).
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B. The Impact of Reciprocity
There has long been a perception that judgments rendered by
U.S. courts fare quite poorly when one seeks to enforce them
abroad.'6 5 There is doubtless some truth in this.'" In many cases,
however, the difficulties that arise when one seeks to enforce U.S.
judgments overseas are not the result of outright refusals on the part
of foreign courts to enforce all U.S. judgments. Rather, these
difficulties stem from reluctance among other nations to enforce
certain types of U.S. judgments under certain circumstances. It is
therefore important to distinguish between states that refuse to
enforce U.S. judgments outright and those that will enforce U.S.
judgments if certain conditions are satisfied. The goal of this analysis
is not to offer a comprehensive account of each nation's recognition
regime but, rather, to sort foreign states into two groups-those
whose judgments would likely be affected by a U.S. reciprocity
requirement and those that likely would not.'67
1. Affected Countries
A small number of countries simply refuse to enforce any and all
foreign judgments, including U.S. judgments. Indonesia is the most
prominent example of such a nation." Other countries generally
prohibit national courts from recognizing and enforcing foreign
judgments in the absence of a judgments treaty between the two
nations. A number of European nations-including Austria,
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden-have adopted
165. Baumgartner, supra note 145, at 175; Miller, supra note 4, at 292. But see Matthew
H. Adler, If We Build It, Will They Come?-The Need for a Multilateral Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Monetary Judgments, 26 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 79,
82 (1994) ("Although there are many scholarly works that discuss the perceived problems
litigants face in seeking recognition and enforcement of U.S. judgments, this perception
currently is not supported by empirical data." (footnotes omitted)); Zeynalova, supra note
52, at 172-78 (discussing lack of reliable empirical data as to foreign practice).
166. See Baumgartner, supra note 145, at 184-85.
167. Each nation's recognition regime is, to be sure, unique and idiosyncratic. One
must be cautious about drawing generalizations about any one regime because there are
inevitably exceptions and counterexamples that cut against the generalization. This Part
makes a number of assertions about foreign state practice based on the prevailing views in
the U.S. legal literature, but it does not attempt to provide a comprehensive account of
how other nations decide whether and under what circumstances to enforce foreign
judgments.
168. See Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U.
PITr. L. REv. 741, 796 (2000) ("In Indonesia, foreign court judgments generally are not
enforceable.").
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such a rule." Since each of these states has declined to enter into any
judgments treaty with the United States, U.S. judgments are generally
unenforceable in each. In other countries still, it may be possible to
enforce U.S. judgments as a formal legal matter, but it may be
difficult (if not impossible) to achieve this end in practice. This
arguably describes the situation in China and Saudi Arabia.'70 If the
United States were to adopt the ALI rule, therefore, it would likely
become impossible to enforce in the United States judgments
rendered by courts in any of the above nations."' The key question is
how interest groups in each of these states would be likely to react to
such a development.
a. Indonesia
Indonesia is one of the few states that refuse to enforce any
foreign judgments."' If the United States were to adopt a policy of
judgments reciprocity, therefore, actual and prospective judgment
creditors in that nation would, at least in theory, be incentivized to
lobby to change this practice so as to preserve their ability to enforce
Indonesian judgments in the United States. Whether Indonesian-
judgment creditors would, in fact, undertake this project is a complex
question. There are, however, at least two reasons to suspect that a
U.S. reciprocity requirement would be unlikely to lead to any change
in Indonesian law.
First, it is unclear that judgment creditors in Indonesia would
perceive an inability to enforce Indonesian judgments in the United
States as a serious threat to their economic interests. So far as can be
determined, there is not a single reported case in which a judgment
creditor sought to enforce an Indonesian judgment in the United
States, which is suggestive (though not conclusive) that such
enforcement actions are relatively rare. If Indonesian-judgment
169. See Baumgartner, supra note 145, at 184-85. Austria also permits its courts to
enforce judgments rendered by states that are on an "approved" list kept by the Austrian
Ministry of Justice. Id. at 184-85, 191-92. To date, the United States has not been placed
on the list for civil money judgments, though it is possible to enforce U.S. judgments
relating to support payments in Austria. See id. at 185.
170. See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
171. This list is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive; there are doubtless
other nations that are unlikely to enforce U.S. judgments. These nameless other nations,
however, have attracted so little attention in American legal literature that the inability of
U.S.-judgment creditors to enforce U.S. judgments in those jurisdictions is probably not of
great significance.
172. See Partnoy, supra note 168, at 796.
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creditors rarely enforce their judgments in the United States, then a
new inability to do so will not meaningfully affect their economic
interests and, hence, will not lead them to lobby for change.
Second, Indonesia has already shown itself to be more or less
indifferent to reciprocity requirements put in place by other
countries. Indonesia is geographically proximate to China, Japan,
Singapore, and South Korea. Its trading relationships with each of
these nations are at least as extensive as its trading relationship with
the United States and, in the case of Japan, much more so."' Each of
these nations has long maintained a policy of judgments reciprocity. 174
To date, however, Indonesia has declined to change its laws relating
to enforcement of foreign judgments. If the adoption of a reciprocity
requirement by no fewer than four other states with comparably
extensive trading relationships with Indonesia has failed to bring
about any change in Indonesian law, the odds that a U.S. reciprocity
requirement would be the proverbial straw that breaks the camel's
back seem slim.
b. The Nordic States and Austria
The Nordic states-Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and
Sweden-have long refused to enforce foreign judgments in the
absence of a judgments treaty."75 These states have also declined to
negotiate any judgments treaties with the United States and,
consequently, it is currently impossible to enforce U.S. judgments in
these states under most circumstances.176 If the United States were to
adopt a policy of judgments reciprocity, then virtually all judgments
rendered by these states would no longer be enforceable in the
173. See Indonesia, U.N. COMTRADE, http://comtrade.un.org/pb/FileFetch.aspx?doclD
=4848&type=country%20pages (last visited Apr. 11, 2014) (stating that Indonesian
exports to Japan totaled approximately $26 billion in 2010 and that its exports to China,
the United States, Singapore, and Korea totaled $16 billion, $14 billion, $14 billion, and
$13 billion, respectively, during that same year).
174. See Minsa sosong beob [Civil Procedure Act], Act No. 547, Apr. 4, 1960, art. 217,
amended by Act No. 10,629, May 19, 2011 (S. Kor.); Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act, Mar. 26, 1959, cap. 265, § 12, as amended (Singapore); Kobayashi &
Furuta, supra note 32, at 117 (Japan); Liu, supra note 32, at 270-71 (China).
175. See Baumgartner, supra note 145, at 184.
176. See id. at 227. There are several limited exceptions to this rule. Norway and
Sweden will enforce judgments from states with which they have not entered into
judgments treaties if there was a forum selection clause in a contract giving exclusive
jurisdiction to the courts of the rendering state. Id. at 187-88. And Finland will enforce
foreign judgments "in cases where, because of lack of personal jurisdiction, the claim
could never have been brought in Finland from the outset." Id. at 188.
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United States. The question then becomes what actions, if any,
judgment creditors in the Nordic states would take in response.177
To obtain a rough sense of the extent to which an inability to
enforce judgments in the United States is likely to be perceived as a
serious threat by foreign-judgment creditors in the Nordic States, it is
useful to consider actual data about how frequently these creditors
seek to enforce judgments in the United States. To this end, I sought
to obtain data that sheds light on the question with respect to all
foreign judgments in the United States. The results are reported in
Table 1. This dataset is drawn from (1) federal complaints filed
between 2008 and 2012 in which a judgment creditor sought to
enforce a foreign judgment in federal court, (2) reported federal cases
between 2008 and 2012 in which a judgment creditor sought to
enforce a foreign judgment in federal court, and (3) reported state
cases between 2008 and 2012 in which a judgment creditor sought to
enforce a foreign judgment in state court. 7s
177. Only Norway and Iceland currently have the authority to negotiate a judgments
treaty with the United States on a bilateral basis. See Thalia Kruger, Case Note, Opinion
1/03, Competence of the Community to Conclude the New Lugano Convention on the
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 189, 194-96 (2006). A recent decision by the European
Court of Justice ruled that the competence to enter into civil and commercial judgments
treaties with nations outside the European Union now lies exclusively with the European
Union; its Member States no longer have the ability to enter into new agreements of this
type with third-party countries. See Case C-1/03, In re Lugano Convention, 2006 ECR I-
1145; Baumgartner, supra note 145, at 181; Kruger, supra, at 198 (2006). Accordingly,
Denmark, Finland and Sweden would only be able to respond to the U.S. reciprocity
requirement by changing the national rules that govern the enforcement of judgments
rendered by non-EU Member states such as the United States. See Kruger, supra, at 194
("EU Member States retain the freedom to shape their national rules regarding
defendants domiciled in third states."). Norway and Iceland, which are not currently
members of the European Union, would be able to respond to the reciprocity requirement
either by enacting national legislation or by negotiating a judgments treaty with the
United States. See Member Countries of the European Union, EUR. UNION,
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/indexen.htm (last visited Apr. 11,
2014) (listing EU members).
178. The methods by which this dataset was collected, and the caveats to which its use
is subject, are set forth in the Appendix.
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Table 1: Selected Actions to Enforce Foreign Money Judgments in U.S.
Courts, 2008-2012
Country Number of Enforcement Total Size of Foreign Judgments
Actions (USD, in millions)
Nigeria 5 308.5
England 25 207.7*
Switzerland 2 103.6
Nicaragua 1 97.0
Japan 2 68.8
Germany 6 29.6
Bahrain 1 25.0
Mexico 3 21.4
Kuwait 1 20.3
Korea 5 20.6*
France 2 14.5
Belgium 3 12.8*
Canada 12 3.6**
Netherlands 3 3.6*
Qatar 1 3.6
Gibraltar 1 3.2
Israel 2 2.4
Australia 3 2.1
Russia 2 2.2
China 4 1.8*
Malta 1 1.1
Philippines 1 1.0
Micronesia 1 0.5
Dubai 1 0.5
Brazil 1 0.4
Norway 1 0.3
Hong Kong 1 0.3
Sweden 2 0.2
Argentina 1 0.2
Estonia 1 0.2
Italy 1 0.2
India 1 0.1
Poland 1 0.1
Uruguay 1 0.1
Source: Federal complaints (PACER) and reported state and federal court decisions
(LexisNexis)
* One of the reported cases from this country did not disclose the size of the judgment.
** Four of the reported cases from this country did not disclose the size of the judgment.
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Significantly, there is little in Table 1 to suggest that judgment
creditors in the Nordic States would perceive a new inability to
enforce judgments in the United States as a serious threat to their
economic interests. The table indicates that in the five-year period
between 2008 and 2012, there was one enforcement action brought by
a judgment creditor from Norway (for $300,000) and two
enforcement actions brought by judgment creditors from Sweden (for
$200,000). There were no enforcement actions brought by judgment
creditors from Denmark, Finland, or Iceland during this same time
period. This dataset is, to be sure, subject to important limitations and
qualifications. 9 Nevertheless, it is the best dataset currently available
and there is very little in it to suggest that judgment creditors in any
of these states would perceive a loss of their ability to enforce their
home judgments in the United States as a serious blow.
An alternative (if still imperfect) means of weighing the intensity
of interest among judgment creditors in the Nordic States is to
consider the number of reported state and federal cases in the United
States over the past fifty years in which a judgment creditor has
sought to enforce a judgment from one of these states.so These
findings are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Reported State and Federal Cases Involving Actions to
Enforce Money Judgments Rendered by Courts in Nordic States
(1963-2012)
Sweden 4 Iceland 0
Denmark 0 Norway 0
Finland 0
Source: Reported state and federal court decisions (LexisNexis)
Even taking into account the selection bias inherent in using
reported cases as opposed to filed complaints, the results of this
inquiry are striking. Over the past fifty years, there does not appear to
have been a single reported case in the United States in which a
judgment creditor sought to enforce a money judgment rendered by a
179. See Appendix.
180. This inquiry is different from the one detailed in Table 1 in that (1) the time frame
is longer, and (2) the only source of data is state and federal reported cases; complaints
from the federal courts are not included.
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court in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, or Norway. 81 Over that same
time period, there have been exactly four reported cases in which
such a creditor has sought to enforce a judgment from Sweden.182 As
a point of comparison, there are at least sixty reported cases over this
same time period in which a litigant sought to enforce a judgment
from England. 8 1
These patterns of past enforcement practice suggest that actual
and potential judgment creditors in the Nordic States are more likely
to react to a U.S. reciprocity requirement with a shrug than with a call
to their elected representatives. When one considers further the fact
that judgment creditors who may wish to lobby for change face
relatively high organizing costs, the low probability that most
judgment creditors will be repeat players, and the lack of any direct
and immediate payoff to lobbying in many cases, the odds that a
lobbying campaign will be launched dwindle further. Add in the fact
that individuals in each of these states may choose to write
enforceable arbitration clauses into their commercial agreements with
U.S. partners, and to enforce any resulting arbitral award in the
United States pursuant to the New York Convention," and
legislative change appears even less likely.
The foregoing analysis applies with equal force to Austria,
subject to one minor caveat. The Ministry of Justice in Austria
maintains a certified list of states whose judgments are presumptively
entitled to enforcement in Austria even in the absence of a treaty
between Austria and that nation." It may perhaps be less costly for
judgment creditors in Austria to persuade their Ministry of Justice to
181. This does not mean that no judgments from these nations were enforced in the
United States during this time. As Table 1 indicates, there was one enforcement action
brought with respect to a Norwegian judgment during the past five years. It does suggest,
however, that actions to enforce judgments rendered by courts in these nations are
relatively rare.
182. See Compagnie Noga D'Importation Et D'Exportation S.A. v. Russian Fed'n, No.
00 Civ. 0632 (WHP), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17749, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2002)
(attempt to enforce Swedish judgment in U.S. court), vacated, 361 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2004);
Svenska Handelsbankeri v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448, 451 (D. Mass. 1966) (same); Baker
& McKenzie Advokatbyra v. Thinkstream Inc., 20 So. 3d 1109, 1111 (La. Ct. App. 2009)
(same); Bonnierforetagen v. Harrison, No. CIV. A. 92-0056-D, 1996 WL 511747, at *3
(Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 1996) (same).
183. See John F. Coyle, Reported State and Federal Cases Involving Actions to
Enforce a Money Judgment Rendered by an English Court, 1963-2012 (spreadsheet on
file with the author).
184. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
185. See Baumgartner, supra note 145, at 184-85, 191-92.
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add the United States to the list than it would be for individuals in the
Nordic States to lobby their respective parliaments. If this is the case,
then there may be an incrementally greater chance that a reciprocity
requirement would bring about a change in Austrian state practice.
All told, however, the prospects for change in Austria seem similarly
grim simply because there is so little evidence that a reciprocity
requirement would have a meaningful economic impact on judgment
creditors there. Over the past fifty years there has been only one
reported case-state or federal-in which a judgment creditor sought
to enforce an Austrian judgment in the United States.186
c. China and Saudi Arabia
Whether a U.S. reciprocity requirement would be likely to bring
about a meaningful change in the law and practice of China and Saudi
Arabia necessitates a slightly different inquiry from the one
undertaken above. The issue in each of these states is not the law on
the books, which suggests that U.S. judgments will be enforced as a
matter of course, but the way the law is applied in practice.
With respect to China, for example, one commentator has stated
that while in theory a foreign party may apply to an Intermediate
People's Court to enforce a foreign judgment, it is in practice difficult
to convince a court to enforce a foreign judgment in China.'"
Similarly, one observer has noted that Saudi Arabia, in theory,
provides a forum in which parties may enforce a judgment against a
Saudi Arabian party obtained abroad: parties may submit their
judgment to the Board of Grievances.' In reality, however, that
Board rarely enforces judgments rendered by foreign courts, except
for the occasional judgments from other members of the League of
Arab States."8 ' The question presented, therefore, is whether the
adoption of a reciprocity requirement by the United States would be
likely to bring about a change in the status quo. On the whole, such
an outcome seems unlikely due to the lack of an institutionalized
186. See Kreditverein Der Bank Austria v. Nejezchleba, 477 F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir.
2007).
187. See Ariel Ye, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Foreign Judgments in
China, 74 DEF. COUNS. J. 248, 251-52 (2007).
188. See The Saudi Legal System, JAPAN DISP. AVOIDANCE NEWSL. No. 82 (Herbert
Smith LLP, Tokyo, Japan), June 2009, available at http://ghazzawilawfirm.com/files
/Dispute%20avoidance%20newsletter%20June%202009.pdf.
189. Id.
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process in each of these states through which interest groups may
influence elected representatives.
The bite of any U.S. reciprocity requirement, it should be
remembered, would not be felt directly by the governments of China
and Saudi Arabia. Instead, it would be felt by judgment creditors in
those states with unenforced judgments against defendants in the
United States.19 0 In democratic states, interest groups frequently have
the ability to shape official policy by lobbying elected officials. These
officials will, at least in theory, be receptive to these overtures
because they implicitly carry the promise of votes and campaign
support. In a hereditary monarchy like Saudi Arabia-where the king
is the head of the state, the commander in chief of the military, and
the de facto court of final appeal in the judicial system-the ability of
interest groups to lobby for change is limited by the fact that the
ultimate decision-maker has no need for votes or campaign support.'9 1
The capacity for interest groups to bring about a change in
government policy is similarly limited in a single-party state like
China, where the officials with the power to alter the policy are
unelected and accountable primarily to other unelected officials.19
This is not to suggest that individuals in Saudi Arabia or China
are powerless to affect government policy; no government can endure
by entirely ignoring the needs of its citizens. It is, however, to suggest
that the ability of judgment creditors to lobby for a change in the way
that the law is administered will be constrained in these states, given
the fact that the officials tasked with deciding this issue are neither
elected nor accountable to other elected officials. Accordingly, it
seems unlikely that the adoption of a policy of judgments reciprocity
by the United States would bring about a change in the way existing
laws are applied in either China or Saudi Arabia because, as a
structural matter, the interest groups most likely to be injured by such
a policy are limited in their ability to influence policy.
Even if this were not the case, however, there is nothing in Table
1 to suggest that an inability to enforce judgments from either country
in the United States would have a substantial economic impact on
190. See supra Part IV.A (noting that the economic impact of any reciprocity policy
would be most keenly felt by the actual and potential foreign-judgment creditors).
191. See A. Michael Tarazi, Recent Development, Saudi Arabia's New Basic Laws: The
Struggle for Participatory Islamic Government, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 258, 264-65 (1993)
(listing the several ways in which the king has unconstrained powers).
192. See Katherine Wilhelm, Rethinking Property Rights in Urban China, 9 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 227,297 (2004).
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foreign-judgment creditors. Between 2008 and 2012, no enforcement
actions were brought with respect to judgments from Saudi Arabia.
During that same time period, only four such actions were brought
with respect to Chinese judgments, the known value of which was
only $1.8 million. These numbers are quite small relative to those of
other states and provide an additional reason to suspect that a
reciprocity requirement would have little impact on practice in either
China or Saudi Arabia.
The foregoing analysis suggests that a U.S. reciprocity
requirement would be highly unlikely to generate change in many
states that categorically refuse to enforce U.S. judgments as a matter
of law or as a matter of practice. In light of this analysis, it is difficult
to imagine any viable means by which a policy of judgments
reciprocity would, by itself, ultimately result in benefits to U.S.-
judgment creditors seeking to enforce U.S. judgments in these states.
This is not, however, the end of the inquiry. It is also important to
consider the likely impact of a U.S. reciprocity requirement on states
that take a less categorical view of U.S. judgments. This topic is taken
up below.
2. Other Countries
This Article next considers the likely impact of the ALI rule on
the nations that will enforce U.S. judgments in some situations but
not others. Some nations, for example, refuse to enforce those
portions of U.S. judgments awarding punitive damages. This is the
case in Germany, Italy, and Japan."' Other nations, by comparison,
193. See Benjamin West Janke & Frangois-Xavier Licari, Enforcing Punitive Damage
Awards in France After Fountaine Pajot, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 775, 776 (2012) ("For
decades, commentators have lamented the reluctance of European courts to recognize and
enforce American judgments awarding non-compensatory damages."); id. at 776-77 & n.9
(noting Germany and Italy both refuse to enforce U.S. punitive damages awards on public
policy grounds); see also Baumgartner, supra note 145, at 216-17 (discussing Italian
reluctance to enforce U.S. punitive damages awards); Ronald A. Brand, Punitive Damages
Revisited: Taking the Rationale for Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments Too Far, 24 J.L.
& COM. 181, 185 (2005) (explaining Germany's refusal to enforce U.S. punitive damages
judgments); Norman T. Braslow, The Recognition and Enforcement of Common Law
Punitive Damages in a Civil Law System: Some Reflections on the Japanese Experience, 16
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 285, 293-94 (1999) (noting a decision by the Supreme Court of
Japan holding that enforcement of punitive damages violated Japanese public policy);
John Y. Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 391, 396-97 & n.24 (2004) (noting that most civil-law systems view "punitive damages
... to be a penal sanction that may be imposed only in criminal proceedings").
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refuse to enforce U.S. judgments in cases where the basis for the U.S.
court's assertion of personal jurisdiction fails to satisfy the local
jurisdictional standard. This is the case in England.19 4 There is no
question that these various rules of recognition will in some cases lead
foreign courts to refuse to enforce particular U.S. judgments. None of
these rules, however, amount to a de facto ban on the enforcement of
U.S. judgments that would obviously trigger a finding that there was a
lack of reciprocity. Whether these nations would be impacted by a
U.S. reciprocity requirement will depend, therefore, on whether their
specific practices would run afoul of the rule proposed by the ALI.
There is good reason to think that many of them would not.
The ALI rule, as discussed above, provides that a refusal by a
foreign court to enforce U.S. punitive or multiple damage awards
shall not be regarded as a denial of reciprocal treatment." This
provision means that the current policies of Germany, Italy, and
Japan with respect to U.S. punitive damages awards do not run afoul
of this particular rule of reciprocity. That same rule, it will be
recalled, places the burden of proving non-recognition on the party
seeking to avoid enforcement.'96 This provision makes it less likely
that a U.S. court will conclude that there is a lack of reciprocity as a
result of the jurisdictional tests applied by countries such as England;
it will be difficult in many cases for the party resisting enforcement to
create a substantial doubt that the courts of these nations would
refuse to enforce comparable U.S. judgments.
194. See Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46 (appeal taken from Eng.) (refusing
to enforce U.S. bankruptcy judgment because U.K. defendant had never submitted to
jurisdiction of U.S. court); Baumgartner, supra note 145, at 190. France used to impose a
strict jurisdictional test but abandoned it in 2006. See Cass. le civ., May 23, 2006, Bull. civ.
1, No. 857.
195. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, § 7(d); supra note 161 and accompanying text.
196. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, § 7(b); supra note 160 and accompanying text.
197. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, § 7(b). The uniform statutory regime for
enforcing U.S. judgments in most U.S. states also permits a U.S. court to decline to
enforce a foreign judgment if the rendering court lacked jurisdiction according to U.S.
jurisdictional standards. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS
RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(2)-(3), 13 pt. II U.L.A. 28 (Supp. 2013); BORN & RUTLEDGE,
supra note 11, at 1125 (2011) ("Most U.S. courts have reviewed the personal jurisdiction of
foreign courts according to U.S. jurisdictional standards, rather than by using the
standards applicable under foreign law." (citing cases)); cf Jeff Larsen, Comment,
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Latin America: Trends and Individual Differences,
17 TEX. INT'L L.J. 213, 215 (1982) ("The most nearly universal requirement for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment is that the original court must have
been competent to decide the case."). While the jurisdictional tests imposed by foreign
states are in some cases more stringent than those imposed by U.S. courts, they are not
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If the United States were to adopt a policy of judgments
reciprocity along the lines suggested by the ALI, therefore, it is not at
all clear that this policy would consistently serve to bar the
enforcement of judgments rendered by courts in England, Germany,
Japan, or Italy."'s It also seems likely that judgments from Canada,
France, Greece, and Spain would continue to be enforceable in many
cases, as each of these nations has historically enforced some (if not
all) U.S. judgments.199 Consequently, it seems unlikely that the
United States' adoption of this particular reciprocity requirement
would generate much in the way of benefits for U.S.-judgment
creditors in many states in Western Europe because relatively few
judgments rendered by courts in these states would, in fact, be denied
recognition by a U.S. court under the rule.2" If this is correct, then it
would not even be necessary to consider the reaction of interest
groups in these states because they would be largely unaffected by the
new rule.
qualitatively different in kind, which provides further reason to question whether
reciprocity would be found not to exist.
198. See Baumgartner, supra note 145, at 185-86 (suggesting that England has
"recognition requirements that are similar to those set up for judgments recognition in the
United States and elsewhere"); id. at 213 ("[Tlhe recognition of U.S. judgments in
Germany remains comparatively liberal."); id. at 219 ("[T]he Italian courts have been
quite generous with the recognition of U.S. judgments."); id. ("[Tihe Swiss Supreme Court
has been quite liberal with the recognition of foreign judgments, including judgments from
the United States."); Yasuhiro Fujita, Enforcing U.S. Judgments in Japan, L.A. LAW., Dec.
2004, at 19 ("U.S. practitioners should note that Japanese courts are enforcing money
judgments rendered by U.S. courts."); see also Weintraub, supra note 38, at 180 (arguing
that "recent changes [in Italy and China] have accelerated the trend toward recognition").
199. See Baumgartner, supra note 145, at 185; id. at 191 ("To the extent that European
countries do recognize foreign judgments, their requirements for doing so are considerably
similar to those prevailing in the United States."); Russell J. Weintraub, Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments and Child Support Obligations in United States and Canadian
Courts, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 361, 378 (1999) (observing that "if respect for foreign legal
proceedings were the same between all countries as it is between the United States and
Canada, the world would be a more pleasant and peaceful place").
200. This insight raises the question of why a number of commentators have argued
that reciprocity is necessary to give the United States "leverage" in the negotiations
relating to the Hague Convention. See infra note 206 and accompanying text. The
nationals of the states that were the primary stumbling blocks to the successful negotiation
of such a treaty were unlikely to feel the sting of reciprocity via the inability to enforce
judgments rendered by courts in those states. It was more likely that they would bear the
(far more modest) costs of defeating motions to refuse enforcement in the United States
for lack of reciprocity. Given the modest nature of the potential sanction, it seems unlikely
that the U.S. adoption of a reciprocity requirement would have prompted countries such
as France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom to enter into a treaty with which they
were otherwise dissatisfied.
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It is possible, to be sure, that the ALI's reciprocity requirement
would occasionally result in a U.S. court refusing to enforce a
judgment rendered by a court in one of the states above. Even if this
were the case, however, it would not significantly alter the analysis. A
reciprocity requirement is most effective when it successfully
motivates all actual and potential judgment creditors in a particular
jurisdiction to pull together by threatening them with the loss of their
ability to enforce judgments in the United States. A weaker threat
necessarily means a weaker incentive effect. Intermittent refusals to
enforce foreign judgments on reciprocity grounds are unlikely to lead
judgment creditors in these states to pressure their home
governments to change their policies vis-A-vis U.S. judgments even if
these individuals routinely seek to enforce sizable judgments in the
United States. Consequently, there is little reason to believe that
these governments will, in fact, change their policies in the face of the
ALI's proposed reciprocity requirement.
C. Summing Up .. . and a Brief Word on Multilateral Judgments
Treaties
The prospect that the reciprocity requirement proposed by the
ALI would succeed in changing the behavior of states that currently
refuse to enforce U.S. judgments in most or all cases-a list that
currently includes Austria, China, Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Indonesia, Norway, Saudi Arabia, and Sweden-is doubtful.20 1 The
prospect that this particular rule would succeed in changing the
behavior of certain states that enforce U.S. judgments under some
(but not all) circumstances-a list that currently includes Canada,
England, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, and Spain, among
others-is likewise doubtful.2" Accordingly, the likelihood that a U.S.
policy of judgments reciprocity modeled along the lines suggested by
the ALI would offer substantial benefits to U.S. nationals is remote.
As the foregoing analysis has shown, there is simply no obvious
mechanism by which this requirement seems likely to generate the
changes that would be necessary for these benefits to be realized.
201. See supra Part V.B.1.a (discussing Indonesia's refusal to enforce foreign
judgments); Part V.B.1.b (discussing the Nordic States' and Austria's refusal to enforce
foreign judgments in the absence of a judgments treaty); Part V.B.1.c (analyzing whether a
reciprocity requirement would lead to change in the law and practice of China and Saudi
Arabia).
202. See supra Part V.B.2 (analyzing the possible impact of the ALI rule in countries
that enforce U.S. judgments in some situations but not others).
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In light of this conclusion, the not insignificant costs of a regime
premised on reciprocity loom large. These costs include the
administrative costs of determining foreign state practice,2 03 the
perceived unfairness of punishing foreign-judgment creditors for the
sins of their governments,20 and the inefficiency inherent in requiring
two parties to litigate the same dispute twice. 05 Given the low
probability that this particular regime of judgments reciprocity will
generate benefits for U.S. nationals, its costs counsel strongly against
its adoption.
Notably, this conclusion would stand even if the ultimate goal of
the reciprocity provision were to give the United States additional
leverage in international negotiations rather than to encourage
foreign legislatures to amend their laws. A number of commentators
have noted that one of the reasons for including the reciprocity
provision in the ALI draft statute in the first place was to strengthen
the hand of the U.S. delegation to the conference to negotiate the
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments.20 6
Officials representing the United States, which has traditionally taken
a relatively liberal attitude to enforcing foreign judgments, found that
they lacked bargaining power because they had little to offer by way
of concessions in these negotiations.2" In the face of this perceived
difficulty, some commentators urged the United States to adopt a
policy of judgments reciprocity unilaterally to obtain the leverage that
it lacked.20 Once the policy was in place, so the argument went, then
the United States could bargain it away in order to obtain concessions
from other nations.
If the desire to obtain bargaining power in international
negotiations was the true reason for adopting a policy of judgments
203. See supra Part II.A.
204. See supra Part II.B.
205. See supra Part II.C.
206. See Adler, supra note 165, at 109 (arguing that adopting a reciprocity requirement
would give the United States leverage in international negotiations relating to a
comprehensive judgments treaty); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to International Law, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 387, 420 (2001) (same). But see
Hulbert, supra note 9, at 653-54 (questioning the viability of such a strategy). See generally
Miller, supra note 4, at 257-66 (providing historical overview of the relationship between
the ALI drafting project and the Hague Convention negotiations); id. at 290-92
(expressing skepticism about the ability of a reciprocity requirement to improve U.S.
leverage in these negotiations).
207. See Murphy, supra note 206, at 420.
208. See, e.g., Discussion of International Jurisdiction and Judgments, supra note 17, at
455 (remarks of Peter H. Pfund).
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reciprocity, then much of the analysis and discussion above-which
focused largely on the interplay between foreign interest groups and
foreign legislators at the domestic level-could be criticized for
focusing on the wrong set of institutions and actors. On this
alternative account, whether the reciprocal legislation is likely to
achieve its desired end will not depend on the preferences of private
interest groups but, rather, on the preferences of official state
representatives formally engaged in the process of international
lawmaking. Accordingly, critics might be tempted to dismiss the
conclusions set forth above on the grounds that they explore the
incentives of the wrong group of actors.
This critique is, however, unconvincing. First, it mistakenly
presumes that the power wielded by interest groups at the domestic
level evaporates when the process of lawmaking shifts to the
international level.209 Second, it overlooks the fact that many states
must obtain the approval of domestic legislatures in order for a treaty
to become legally binding.210 Finally, and most fundamentally, this
critique overlooks the fact that the state officials tasked with
negotiating international treaties whose effects will be predominantly
felt by private actors will in almost all cases seek input from these
private actors in formulating their official negotiating positions.' If
the United States were to adopt a policy of judgments reciprocity as a
means of obtaining more leverage in international negotiations, it is
likely that representatives from other states would respond to this
development by reaching out to private actors in their home states to
gauge their reactions. When many of these actors respond that the
inconvenience presented by the new policy would be minimal-as the
foregoing analysis suggests that they would-then it is difficult to see
how the United States would gain any leverage. Even if one believes
that the true purpose of reciprocal legislation in this context is to
enhance the bargaining strength of the United States in international
209. See Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in
International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743, 761-80 (1999) (discussing the
prominent role played by interest groups in shaping a number of multilateral treaties
affecting private rights).
210. See Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S.
Constitution, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307, 313 (2007) ("[T]he domestic law of many countries
... requires that the executive obtain legislative approval before concluding treaties.").
211. See Mary Helen Carlson, U.S. Participation in the International Unification of
Private Law: The Making of the UNCITRAL Draft Carriage of Goods by Sea Convention,
31 TUL. MAR. L.J. 615, 621-24 (2007) (discussing the extensive role played by private
groups in shaping the U.S. approach to private international lawmaking).
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negotiations, therefore, the basic contention set forth above-that a
policy of judgments reciprocity is unlikely to offer much in the way of
benefits to U.S. nationals-still holds.
CONCLUSION
If a policy of judgments reciprocity is unlikely to persuade the
nations that currently refuse to enforce U.S. judgments to change
their practice-as seems to be the case-then the answer to the
question of whether to adopt such a policy is easy. Given the non-
trivial costs inherent in a regime of judgments reciprocity, it is unwise
to adopt such a regime when its promised benefits are unlikely to be
realized. This has, to be sure, long been the intuition of scholars who
write in this area. These intuitions were, however, based largely upon
citations to decades-old academic articles that offered little in the way
of evidence to support the claim.212 This Article, by contrast, mined
the historical record to identify actual examples in which reciprocal
legislation achieved its goal. It identified a common element among
these disparate examples-the role of interest groups in shaping state
response-and used this element to construct a framework for
evaluating the likelihood that a reciprocity requirement would
prompt foreign states to change their practice. On the basis of this
analysis, the Article argued that a particular policy of judgments
reciprocity was likely to impose not-insignificant costs on U.S. courts
and foreign litigants with little in the way of offsetting benefits. 213 All
of this suggests that adopting a policy of judgments reciprocity, at
least along the lines suggested by the ALI, is not in the long-term best
interests of the United States.
Whether judgments reciprocity is good policy is, of course, a
separate question from whether it is good politics. Even if one
ultimately concludes that adopting a federal statute containing a
reciprocity clause along the lines proposed by the ALI is bad policy, it
is possible that Congress would insist upon including such a clause in
the statute for political reasons. In this situation, the advantages of
having a uniform federal rule on the topic of foreign judgments would
have to be weighed against the disadvantages of having an ineffective
212. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
213. Even if the party resisting enforcement had the burden of proving a lack of
reciprocity, the judgment creditor would still be well advised to oppose these efforts in
contested cases by hiring an expert witness to testify that the rendering state would
enforce a U.S. judgment.
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(and costly) reciprocity requirement. This Article takes no position
on this question. It merely notes that, as a policy matter, the best
available information currently suggests that requiring reciprocity is
unlikely to generate many benefits for U.S. nationals by encouraging
foreign states that currently refuse to enforce U.S. judgments to
change their ways.
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APPENDIX
Table 1 presents information relating to (1) federal complaints
and (2) reported state and federal cases involving attempts to enforce
foreign judgments in the United States between 2008 and 2012. The
precise means by which this information was collected is set forth
below.
Federal Complaints. The source for federal complaints is Public
Access to Court Electronic Records ("PACER"), which was accessed
through the Bloomberg Law interface. PACER is an "electronic
public access service that allows users to obtain case and docket
information from federal appellate, district and bankruptcy courts in
the United States."2 14 In order to locate complaints in which one party
sought to enforce a foreign judgment against another, I worked with
two research assistants to use the "search dockets" feature in the
Bloomberg Law database. We first searched courts: "U.S. District
Court Dockets." We then searched the date range 1/1/2008-
12/31/2012. We then searched by Nature of Suit code "Contract -
Enforcement of Judgment [*150]." This search yielded 2,649 initial
hits. We opened each of these complaints to look at the docket sheet
to determine whether the complaint was filed in order to enforce a
foreign money judgment. Of the 2,649 initial hits, only thirty-eight
involved attempts to enforce judgments rendered by foreign courts;
the remainder involved attempts to enforce judgments rendered in
other U.S. jurisdictions. The relevant information from these thirty-
eight complaints-judgment size and rendering court-was then
added to the chart.
Reported State Cases. The source for these cases was the
LexisNexis database. In order to identify these cases, I. first
performed a search in LexisNexis in "State Court Cases, Combined"
for the term "foreign money judgment" for the date range 1/1/2008-
12/31/2012. This search resulted in fifty-one hits. I reviewed these hits
to determine which ones involved attempts to enforce judgments
rendered by foreign courts. After examining each case, I identified
twenty-five cases in which one party sought to enforce a foreign
money judgment against another. The relevant information from
these twenty-five cases-judgment size and rendering court-was
then added to the chart.
214. PACER, http://www.pacer.gov/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2014).
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Next, I performed a subsequent search in LexisNexis in "State
Court Cases, Combined" for the term "foreign country money
judgment" for the date range 1/1/2008-12/31/2012. This search
resulted in thirty-six hits. I reviewed these hits to determine which
ones involved attempts to enforce judgments rendered by foreign
courts. I identified seven such cases not already captured by the initial
search. The relevant information from these seven cases was then
added to the chart.
I then performed an additional search in LexisNexis in "State
Court Cases, Combined" for the term "CPLR 5303" or "Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code sec. 1715" or "Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §36.001" or
"§ 55.604" for the date range 1/1/2008-12/31/2012. These are the state
statutes that govern actions to enforce foreign judgments in New
York, California, Texas, and Florida respectively. This search resulted
in twenty-six hits. I reviewed these hits to determine which ones
involved attempts to enforce judgments rendered by foreign courts. I
identified three such cases not already captured by earlier searches.
The relevant information from two of these cases was added to the
chart. The relevant information for the other case was not added to
the chart due to the disproportionate size of the judgment ($2.6
billion) relative to the loss allegedly suffered by the plaintiff
($2,550).215
Reported Federal Cases. The source for these cases was the
LexisNexis database. In order to identify these cases, I first
performed a search in LexisNexis in "Federal Court Cases,
Combined" for the term "foreign money judgment or foreign
judgment or foreign country money judgment" for the date range
1/1/2008-12/31/2012. This search resulted in 491 hits. I reviewed these
hits to determine which ones involved attempts to enforce judgments
rendered by foreign courts. I identified twenty-seven such cases not
already captured by the previous searches. The relevant information
for these cases was then added to the chart.216
215. See Bandera de Gusmao de Mello v. Banco Bradesco S.A., No. 600043/06, 2010
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2615, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 8, 2010) (involving an attempt by a
Brazilian plaintiff to enforce a Brazilian judgment of $2.6 billion in New York when the
actual damages-as found by a Brazilian court-amounted to only $2,550).
216. There were two noteworthy federal cases that were not included in the chart for
different reasons. The first, Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012), was
excluded because the plaintiffs in that case had not attempted to enforce an Ecuadorean
money judgment of approximately $17.2 billion in the United States. The second, Sea
Search Armada v. Republic of Colombia, 821 F. Supp. 2d 268 (D.D.C. 2011), was omitted
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In total, information from thirty-four state court cases and
twenty-seven federal cases published between 2008 and 2012 is
reflected in Table 1.217
Potential Weaknesses in PACER Data. The use of federal
complaints to gain insight into foreign-judgment-recognition practice
in the United States may be criticized on several grounds. First, owing
to the ways in which the PACER system operates, it is unlikely that
every federal complaint makes its way into the PACER system. It is
therefore likely that there were additional actions brought in federal
court to enforce a foreign judgment between 2008 and 2012 that are
not available through PACER and, hence, are absent from the
dataset. Second, owing to the ways in which the PACER suit codes
operate, litigants are not allowed to check more than one "box" for
the "type of suit" at issue. Accordingly, there may be some cases in
which a litigant (or a court clerk) checks a box for a substantive area
reflecting the underlying dispute rather than the enforcement box. If
these missing complaints were to be identified and the relevant
information from them added to the chart, a different picture as to
the nature of enforcement practice may emerge. These limitations
notwithstanding, the PACER system arguably represents the "best,
most representative data set available" when it comes to tracking
complaints filed at the federal level.218
Potential Weaknesses in Reported Case Data. The use of reported
cases to gain insight into foreign-judgment-recognition practice in the
United States is also potentially subject to criticism. It is well known
that reported cases are not necessarily representative of all cases filed
in a particular jurisdiction.2 19 Ideally, one would look to complaint
data relating to the enforcement of foreign judgments. This was done
with respect to federal complaints via the search in PACER and this
data is reported in Table 1. State-level complaint data are not,
because the court in the case concluded that no foreign money judgment had, in fact, been
rendered.
217. It should be noted that although these cases were all reported between 2008 and
2012, some of them were first filed prior to 2008.
218. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement
Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 682 n.22 (2011) (noting limitations in
data collected from PACER).
219. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The United States' Approach to International Civil
Litigation: Recent Developments in Forum Selection, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 10
(1998) (citing RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK
FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 59 (Stephen B. Burbank,
reporter, 1989)).
1173
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
however, reflected in Table 1 because no state currently collects this
data and it is not currently possible to search state-level complaints to
identify those in which one party is seeking to enforce a foreign
judgment. If this information were to become available, it may
present a different picture of enforcement practice. Until this day
arrives, reported state and federal cases offer one of the best, if
imperfect, sources of information about enforcement practices.220
220. See Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipolarity in
Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 Sw. J.
INT'L L. 31, 36 (2011) (observing that there are "very little data" available with respect to
enforcement practice).
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